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ABSTRACT
The thesis is an attempt to analyse the political economy of regulation by examining two 
commodity markets in Sierra Leone - an importable rice market and an exportable coffee 
market for the period 1964 - 1986. The main goals of the thesis are:
(i) to estimate the welfare costs of rent seeking in the rice market, and
(ii) to examine producer behaviour in the light of a state monopsony which pays a farm
gate price to coffee producers well below the World market price.
The thesis begins with a review of the rent-seeking literature to provide a framework for the 
empirical work.
A model is constructed for the rice market in which consumers self-select across three 
segments of the market:
(a) queuing for rice at controlled prices,
(b) paying a politician a premium for a Rice Purchasing Authority (RPA) or "chit", and
(c) buying rice in the free market at higher clearing prices.
A model is also constructed to explain the behaviour of a representative coffee farmer who 
faces a choice between selling his output in the official market or selling it illegally himself 
or to traders who smuggle.
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The empirical results suggest:
(i) that a substantial volume of resources was allocated to rent seeking (5.3 % of GDP) 
on rice imports alone in 1986, and
(ii) econometric results confirm that the short-run output response of coffee producers 
depends on other factors rather than the official (marginal) price of their output on 
its own.
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Chapter One
PROBLEM AND OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
1.1 Introduction - Why Rent Seeking is Important
The Sierra Leonean economy has been experiencing severe economic and financial 
difficulties since the early 1980’s. The massive decline of the economy is the result of both 
external and internal factors, including negative terms of trade trends, and other external 
events as well as grossly inappropriate policies including over-valued exchange rates, export 
taxation and pricing policies and tribal interest group conflict. These policies are thought 
to have impacted negatively on supply and the diversification of the economy throughout the 
1980’s.
The advice usually offered to policy makers in economies in crisis such as Sierra Leone is 
predicated on an implicit model of a state run by a platonic Guardian. The widely accepted 
view in the early development literature is that a benevolent state, acting to maximise societal 
welfare, can intervene in an optimal way to correct market failure and enhance development. 
Governments in third world economies, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, influenced by this 
advice, intervened massively in economic activity.
In Sierra Leone, a combination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies were utilised in 
pursuit of government policy objectives. At the macroeconomic level, the emphasis of 
policies has been on exchange rate controls and monetary and fiscal policies in support of
growth. At the sectoral level, the approach has been interventionist especially in input and 
output markets and the regulation of exports through various parastatal agencies. However, 
these interventions have proved to be ineffective or worse than the disease of market failure 
that they were thought to cure. Instead of correcting the macroeconomic imbalances, 
restrictive regulations provided significant opportunities for rent-seeking.
The persistence of policies which affected efficient resource allocation was evidence of the 
presence of powerful interest groups and coalitions which pushed and pulled the state to 
pursue policies that created distortions in economic activity. It was also evidence of the 
increasing responsiveness of government to more vocal groups in Society. For policy 
analysis, therefore, the state must be seen essentially as a rent-allocating agent and a rent- 
seeker which utilized its comparative advantage in coercion (Lai, 1988).
The realisation that the state was an arena of distributional struggles among conflicting 
interests gave birth to the new political economy. Rather than being "an exogenous force 
trying to do good, (the state) is at least partially endogenous and the policies it institutes will 
reflect vested interests in society" (Collander, 1984, p2). Economists have sought to explain 
the existence of private interest groups in society which engage in directly unproductive 
profit-seeking (DUP) activities (Baghwati, 1982). The main conclusions of this new political 
economy are:
1. Non-competitive rent-seeking is unproductive and always welfare worsening.
2. The political process is a reflection of the activities of powerful lobbies organised for 
the sole purpose of engaging in distributional struggles and on the reaction of the 
government, which allocates the rent-generating opportunities.
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3. Rent-seeking activity is directly related to the size of government activity in the
economy (Gallagher, 1991) and given the welfare worsening result of such DUP 
activity and its effects on economic growth, reorienting the role of the state to a 
provider of basic services via liberalisation of the economy is recommended.
An important problem is to quantify the rents in the economy of Sierra Leone. The present 
study is confined to the agricultural crops subsector which has two main sub-divisions:
(i) Crops produced for domestic consumption - in this case, rice.
(ii) Crops produced for export - coffee and cocoa.
The major traded food crop is rice. Other food crops include maize and root crops such as 
yams and cassava. But these are potentially tradable and hence incentives for their 
production and consumption are significantly influenced by traded food prices.
The main objective of the study is to make a shot of the value of rent-seeking activity in the 
rice market in 1986. In 1986, reforms in prices and exchange rates which were begun in 
1982-83 were intensified. However, whereas the exchange rate was partially market- 
determined, the government maintained the subsidies on rice and petroleum products to 
cushion the inflationary effects of devaluation. This was politically expedient since riots in 
a neighbouring country brought about by huge increases in the price of rice, had led to the 
overthrow of that government.
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1.2 Background of the Economy
Sierra Leone was classified as a least-developed country by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1981. It has an estimated population of four million people growing at a rate 
of 2.7 percent per annum. Per capita income was estimated at US $122 in 1985/86. The 
distribution of income is markedly uneven and a great majority of the population are 
estimated to live in absolute poverty. The infant mortality rate of 160-200 and life 
expectancy of 42 years put the country near the bottom in health indicators. Low levels of 
social development are indicated by very high rates of illiteracy among the population.
Sierra Leone is one of the smallest countries in Africa endowed with rich mineral deposits, 
land, labour and rich fisheries. The economy is small and open based on agriculture and 
mining. Agriculture employs most of the population in low productivity, labour-intensive 
farming mainly on small holdings. It contributes the largest share of overall economic 
activity about 40 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1985/86 (see Table 1.1). It 
is the principal livelihood for about 70 percent of the population and accounts for about a 
quarter of export earnings in the early 1980s (Table 1.2).
A combination of poor macroeconomic and sectoral policies including unfavourable pricing 
policy have been the major cause of the decline in output. The transition from a nearly 
food-surplus to a food-deficit-importing country reflects the failed policies of the past.
The food and cash crop subsector accounts for the largest share of agricultural GDP (Table 
1.3) with rice the most important economic and food crop. Agricultural exports, mainly
Coffee and Cocoa accounted for about 51.8 percent of the value of exports in 1980, but have 
since declined substantially throughout the decade.
Mining is an important sector of the economy, contributing about 18 percent of GDP in 
1985/86 although it has declined in recent years. Its products are among the country’s major 
foreign exchange earners. Its main importance in the economy and especially its role as the 
leading sector in economic development are brought out clearly by its contributions to export 
earnings and to over 50 percent of total budgetary revenues. Exports of minerals during the 
1960s and early 1970s contributed nearly 80 percent of export earnings, with diamonds alone 
contributing over 60 percent. The industries sector is very small. The manufacturing sub­
sector, consists of medium-to-small factories, most of which produce import-substituting 
goods with a high import content. It contributes about 4 percent of GDP and employs less 
than 1 percent of the labour force.
The high ratios of external trade to GDP and of taxes and duties on international trade to the 
total revenue of the government (averaging over 50 percent in the early 1980s) indicate that 
the country is highly dependent on external trade. Almost all the exports are of unprocessed 
minerals and agricultural commodities, while the imports consist mainly of food, mineral fuel 
and manufactured commodities. Most consumer goods are imported, with urban 
consumption having a high import content. Imports of food include basic foodstuffs such 
as rice and sugar.
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Table 1.1 SIERRA LEONE; Distribution of Gross Domestic Product At Current Prices
1980/81 - 1990/91 (Percentage Shares)
80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91
Agriculture 32.3 35.8 38.1 40.1 “ 4T .T ..... 39.7 41.0 41.7 40.1 38.3 37.6
Mining &
Quarrying 9.9 6.2 5.5 5.3 6.2 18.0 11.4 7.9 6.3 7.6 10.6
Manufacturing 4.6 6.7 6.0 5.1 3.6 3.5 4.8 4.8 6.7 6.6 4.9
Electricity &
Water 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2
Construction 4.6 3.6 ' 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.8 2.7 2.0 1.3
Wholesale &
Retail Trade 13.8 11.5 12.9 11.2 16.3 14.3 17.3 21.0 21.2 25.2 21.6
Transport &
Communications 16.7 19.0 18.0 17.9 11.7 8.3 9.9 9.2 10.7 11.1 9.5
Finance, Insurance &
Business 8.2 8.4 8.2 10.3 9.3 9.1 9.3 9.3 8.9 8.2 13.3
Other Services 4.4 4.2 4.1 3.7 2.2 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.1 0.6 0.4
Producers of Gov’t 
services 5.4 6.0 5.7 4.6 3.9 3.5 2.9 3.1 2.6 2.1 3.2
Less Imputed
Services Charges -0.5 -2.0 -1.8 -1.5 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -2.0 -2.6
GDP at Factor Cost 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Central statistics Office, 1992
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Table 1.2 Value of Agricultural Exports. 1980-1991 (Million US dollars)
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Coffee 27.3 25.7 11.6 12.7 15.2 7.5 7.1 2.9
Cocoa 22.7 20.2 12.7 19.2 14.3 10.5 5.7 6.0
Piassava 0.8 0.1 - 0.1 0.1 — - --
Palm Kernels 0.2 1.2 0.3 — 0.2 — — 0.1
Ginger 0.8 0.1 -- -- -- - - --
Tobacco -- ~ 0.9 0.8 1.4 0.6 1.4 --
Fish and Shrimps — — — 2.5 2.5 1.9 1.2 0.4
Agricultural Exports 51.8 47.3 24.6 35.4 33.1 21.3 14.6 10.9
All Exports 207.1 130.2 128.5 128.5 106.4 141.6 136.8 144.8
Agricultural Exports 
as % of All Exports
25.0 36.3 19.1 27.5 31.1 15.0 10.7 7.5
Total Exports 
as % of GDP
25.9 9.7 - -- 8.3 6.1 7.5 7.4
Note: Prior to 1987, tobacco, fish and shrimps exports were recorded under "Other Exports". 
Source: Bank of Sierra Leone, 1992
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Table 1.3 Agricultural GDP bv Subsector in Current Prices. 1980/81 - 1987/88 (Million Leones)
1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88
Food and 
Cash Crops
293.3 335.9 398.5 526.9 1,471.2 5,130.4 5,130.4 6,482.2
Animal
Husbandry
17.5 72.8 108.0 118.1 300.1 300.1 446.9 681.0
Forestry 26.4 53.5 78.1 133.8 285.3 285.3 561.2 1,317.2
Fishery 42.0 56.4 101.4 273.8 831.5 831.5 1,559.8 3,185.0
Total Agri­
cultural 
GDP
379.2 538.6 686.0 1,052.6 2,069.5 2,888.1 7,698.3 11,665.4
Source: Central Statistics Office, 1992
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1.3 The Economic Decline of the 1980s
During the first decade after independence in 1961, the economy grew at nearly 4 percent 
a year. This growth was triggered by investment in mining and in the small import 
substitution sector. The fiscal and foreign exchange position was healthy, and inflation was 
low. GDP growth slowed to about 1 percent a year in 1975-80 mainly because of falling 
incomes from the mining sector.
Expansionary budgetary policies compounded by the effects of rising import costs during the 
second oil crisis resulted in worsening fiscal and current account deficits and set the stage 
for the difficulties that surfaced in the following years. In the first half of the 1980s, the 
economy went into steep decline. Budgetary revenues fell from over 16 percent of GDP in 
1980/81 to only 5.4 percent in 1985/86. Decreasing export earnings have resulted in 
increasing budget deficits financed mainly by borrowing from the domestic banking system 
which accelerated inflation during the 1980s peaking at close to 170 percent in 1986/87. To 
protect urban consumers from price increase of basic consumer imports caused by a 
depreciating currency, the government resorted to various kinds of exchange and price 
controls. The result is that a rapidly expanding parallel market in foreign exchange and 
other trade emerged during the period. Government subsidies on imported rice designed to 
cushion the effect of higher staple prices on the incomes of urbanites created low local 
producer prices. This led to increased smuggling of rice across the borders where higher 
prices were offered.
Because of an overvalued exchange rate - combined with effects of declining prices - official 
diamond and gold exports fell sharply as these commodities were increasingly traded in the
parallel market. Official cocoa and coffee exports also declined as falling real procurement 
prices offered by the state monopoly made smuggling more profitable.
Development expenditure also suffered tremendously during the crisis. Rural feeder roads 
are in a state of collapse, and some of the trunk roads are also in very poor condition. This 
has prevented farmers from bringing their products to urban markets and is an important 
factor in high food prices. Human resource development has been neglected for many years, 
with schools and hospitals lacking even the most basic supplies.
In the mid-1980s, a new Government began to address the structural problems in the 
economy. It launched a comprehensive economic reform program including adoption of a 
market-determined exchange rate, a liberalized import regime, decontrol of prices for many 
basic goods and services and a gradual phasing out of all subsidies aimed at structural 
adjustment combined with restrictive fiscal and monetary policies to stabilize the economy.1 
The Program which was supported by an International Monetary Fund (IMF) standby 
arrangement in November 1986 was suspended in March 1987 mainly due to a lack of 
expenditure control and monitoring.2 Since April 1992, significant reforms have been 
implemented and the Government efforts have received support from the IMF and the World 
Bank.
1 The commitment was for a termination of all subsidies.
2Over the two decades 1966/67 to 1986/87, Sierra Leone concluded eight programs with the 
IMF. With the exception of the one in 1979/80, they were all suspended before the credits 
had been fully utilised. (Weeks, 1992)
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1.4 Methodology and Limitations of the Analysis
The method of analysis utilized in this study is different from when fuller data sets are 
available as in developed countries. In the absence of reliable data, synthetic data sets are 
used and the limited information contained in various studies and Government reports.
In the absence of actual data to compute the true welfare costs of rent-seeking (derived in 
the theoretical model), a second-best guess—the annual value of the rents—has been used in 
the estimation. The data base for the estimation and the detailed methodology is provided 
in Section 5.3.
Rent-seeking is no doubt important, but from an empirical point of view. It is very difficult 
to calculate the costs of rent-seeking. The costs may be very large in contrast to those 
associated with traditional calculations of deadweight losses.
Many empirical estimates of rent-seeking measure the size of rents, and then conclude that 
the costs of rent-seeking in terms of the resources used up in competitive markets equals the 
size of the rents. This rests on the rather untenable assumption that rents are competitive. 
But it is the form as well as the degree of competition which affects whether the costs of rent 
seeking exhaust the value of rents. If rents are auctioned openly to the highest bidder, then 
we would expect the maximum bid (=  cost) to be the value of the rents. But, if competition 
between rent-seeking agents took place more covertly via bribes and other discreet lobbying 
(as was the case in the situation to be described here), then with several agents involved the
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sum of each of their costs spent on securing the rents could exceed the total value of the 
rents.
1.5 Review of Chapters
The rest of the study is made up of six other chapters. Chapter two reviews the rent-seeking 
literature to provide a framework for the empirical work. Chapter three discusses an 
overview of the type of controls that existed in Sierra Leone during the period. These 
controls are classified under two headings - goods market and external sector controls. A 
detailed description of the rice market to show the rent mechanisms in that market concludes 
the chapter.
Chapter four is the theoretical chapter which explains the model that is constructed for the 
rice market in which consumers self-select across three segments of the market. In each 
segment, the associated welfare costs of rent-seeking are theoretically computed.
Chapter five explains the methodology to compute the size of the costs of rent-seeking in the 
rice market. The empirical estimates are also discussed.
Chapter six discusses the theoretical model constructed to explain the behaviour of the 
representative farmer who faces a choice between selling his output in the official market or 
selling it illegally himself or to traders who smuggle.
Chapter seven is the concluding chapter.
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Chapter 2
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION (REVIEW OF RENT-SEEKING 
LITERATURE AND ITS MEASUREMENT)
2.1 Meaning of Rent Seeking
Rent seeking has been defined as the use of economic resources to capture politically created 
rents. These activities may entail direct waste of resources (eg. over-investment in capacity 
to qualify for import licenses or waiting in line to benefit from subsidies or smuggling to 
avoid custom duties) or transfers (eg. bribes from rent seekers to officials that allocate rice 
chits). Tollison (1982) defines rent-seeking activities as the "activity of wasting resources 
in competing for artificially contrived transfers..." (p. 577).
Krueger (1974) first used the term rent-seeking to refer to economic resources that are 
expended to capture or circumvent government policies that entail the transfers of income 
or wealth. Krueger develops her model around import regimes with quantitative restrictions 
where the rents are generated through the allocation of licenses. Her rent-seeking phrase is 
meant to characterise the activities by lobbies resulting from quantitative policy interventions. 
Bhagwati (1982) extended the analysis and suggested that the issue was far more general. 
Bhagwati’s taxonomy of policy-intervention related activities includes tariff-seeking, revenue- 
seeking, monopoly-seeking and other restriction-seeking (or avoidance activities), all of 
which he classified under the general heading of Directly Unproductive Profit-seeking (DUP) 
activities. They are legal or illegal activities that give rise or result from economic
23
distortions with the aim to capture rent or revenue or to avoid the negative incidence of such 
distortionary activities. Krueger’s analysis of rent-seeking activities relates to a subset of 
Bhagwati’s class of DUP activities. Her rent-seeking activities is a legal process of DUP 
activity undertaken under a fixed import quota and thus excludes other DUP activities such 
as price-distortion triggered DUP activities (eg. revenue seeking, Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 
(1980)) or DUP activities that involve evading a policy instrument (eg. tariff-evasion, 
Bhagwati and Hansen, (1973)). The quantitative restriction counterpart of revenue seeking 
is Krueger’s rent seeking.
2.2 The Social Costs of Price Regulation
Governments create rents by intervening in markets. The existence of rents produces rent- 
seeking behaviour which is costly to the economy as a whole. The basic explanation of why 
such rent-seeking behaviour generates waste is that, to get preferential treatment from 
government subsidies for example, individuals withdraw real resources from some sector of 
the economy and spend these resources on rent-seeking activities. These activities bring 
private benefits to individuals but are socially wasteful for the whole economy since they 
result in a shrinking of the economy’s production possibility frontier. The costs of such rent- 
seeking activity must, therefore, be included in any measure of the social costs to the 
economy. The social costs of rent-seeking are illustrated by demonstrating the welfare 
effects of a consumer subsidy on the price of imported rice (Figure 2.1 below).
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the desired price, Pd. The government now intervenes by lowering the c.i.f. price of 
imported rice in the domestic market. It maintains the lower domestic price Pd and 
pays a subsidy to the agency responsible for importing and distributing the rice.
If free imports are allowed, consumers respond to the lower prices by increasing 
consumption (they move from point H to point J on the domestic demand curve) and 
producers reduce domestic production (they move from point G to K on the supply 
curve). The adjustments to consumption and production resulting from the subsidies 
are the direct welfare effects of the subsidy. The standard welfare loss of regulation 
is given by the usual triangular measure of deadweight loss.
Now suppose that due to the higher costs of imports and the limited foreign reserves 
available, imports are restricted at q2 with no domestic supply. At the low domestic 
price, Pd, excess demand is created equal to (q4 - q^. The new domestic free market 
price is P and the result of the intervention now is that the commodity achieves new 
value of rent per unit = P - Pd. The usual triangular deadweight loss is area BKJ - the 
direct welfare effects of the subsidy. But that is not all. Individuals now expend 
resources to get a share of the revenues resulting from the price intervention (revenue- 
seeking). The indirect welfare effects of the subsidy results in individuals redirecting 
other resources in an attempt to capture the benefits of the subsidy. In the situation 
here, rents are generated through allocation via waiting line or the chit system. 
Tullock (1967) argued that any resources spent to capture the area of rectangle of rents
26
Figure 2.1 The Welfare Effects of a Subsidy
P r i c e
P
Q u a n t i ty0 q q q qz +3
Where
DD and SS are the domestic demand and supply of rice respectively, 
P is the free market with fixed imports at 
P* is the self-sufficiency price,
PW is the constant world price,
Pd is the domestic price before devaluation 
Pd' is the domestic price after devaluation
In the initial situation, with an overvalued exchange rate, rice imports sell at the 
desired domestic price, Pd. No further intervention is required since the costs of 
imports is met from domestic sales and no subsidy is paid by the government. (The 
overvalued exchange rate serves as the consumer subsidy). With a devaluation of the 
currency, the price of imports rise to the new domestic price, Pd' which is higher than
25
(area PBKL) were also a social cost and must be added to the standard welfare triangle 
loss. The area of the rectangle is a measure of the resources devoted to rent seeking 
and exceed the area of the triangle BKJ. Rent-seeking entails cost in addition to the 
production and consumption costs of the quota. The additional production cost of the 
rent-seeking activity may be estimated as the value of the rents.
The logic and analysis are analogous for a country that pays domestic export producers 
a lower producer price for exports than that prevailing in world markets. The import 
subsidy becomes an export tax that discourages the production of export crops for 
which the country has a comparative advantage. However, in this case, the 
government earns revenue rather than disbursing them. There is a difference in the 
political economy of the policy. Whereas in the subsidy, individuals spend resources 
to capture a share of the benefits resulting from interventions, in the case of the export 
tax, they spend resources to avoid the depredation of the state - they smuggle the crop 
(tariff evasion). As Bates (1981) puts it clearly, they use the market against the state 
by using competing channels to market their produce.
Varian (1991) explains that in a single market analysis, the area of the rectangle may 
not be a good approximation to the total deadweight loss due to rent-seeking. The 
reason is that in this case, the costs of rent-seeking are made up of "transaction costs" 
and direct transfers (eg. bribes). Transaction or direct costs (as Gallagher (1991) calls 
them) are part of the social loss but direct transfers do not generate any deadweight
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loss. Hence, in addition to free rider problems, if the production technology of the 
rents is incorporated, the rectangle of rents overstates the social costs of rent-seeking. 
The sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus is only an upper bound on costs 
of rent-seeking. Krueger shows that rent-seeking is always welfare worsening. 
However, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980) show that due to second-best considerations, 
revenue-seeking may be welfare improving. The reason is that unproductive activity 
such as lobbying can, and often will, result from the existence of distortions—eg. 
Krueger's case where distortionary import quotas are sought by premium-seeking 
lobbies for their windfall rents. In this sense, the diversion of resources into 
unproductive activity has to be considered in a second-best context. Therefore, such 
activities may paradoxically be indirectly and ultimately welfare improving.
2.3 Rent Dissipation
Krueger explains that importers will invest in overcapacity to gain import licenses or 
individuals in over-qualification to secure civil service jobs up to the point where the 
marginal opportunity cost of the activity is equal to the marginal benefit received 
through use of import licenses or civil service jobs secured. She showed that with 
competitive rent-seeking, the rents are exactly dissipated, ie. the production costs of 
rent seeking equals the value of the rents. The classic way in which rents are 
dissipated is queues are formed (Barzel, (1974)) and black markets develop for the 
commodity. In Deacon and Sonstelie (1989)), consumer adopt various technologies
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that would reduce the cost of queuing and showed that over-dissipation of rents will 
generally occur in these circumstances. The extent to which rent seeking dissipates 
the rents in a socially wasteful manner depends very much on the method of allocation 
of rents.
2.4 Empirical Estimates of Rent Seeking
For empirical evidence, Krueger calculated the costs of rent-seeking by estimating the 
premia on import licenses and found that 7% of Indian GNP and 15% of Turkish GNP 
was absorbed in rent-seeking costs over import licenses only. Mohammad and 
Whalley (1984) classified rent-seeking by sectors to identify the means of rent-seeking 
and which markets are affected by rent creation. Their classifications are (i) external 
sector controls, (ii) goods market controls, (iii) controls on credit markets and (iv) 
labour market controls. Following Krueger, they calculated the costs of rent-seeking 
by estimating the premia on commodities sold on the free market and of premia on 
import licenses. They estimated rent-seeking costs for the Indian economy to be 30- 
45% of GNP in 1980. Similarly, using Mohammad and Whalley's classification and 
estimation procedure, Ampofo-Tuffour et al (1991) found rent-seeking costs to be 18- 
21% and 22-25% of GDP in 1981 and 1984, respectively, for the Ghanaian economy. 
Despite the use of a crude approximation to calculate the costs of rent-seeking, the 
results suggest that the costs of unproductive activity can be very high especially for 
small economies.
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Chapter 3
REGULATION IN SIERRA LEONE - AN OVERVIEW
3.1 The Political Economy of the Rents System
Government interventions, controls and policies in Sierra Leone during the 1970's and, 
especially in the early 1980's, generated huge benefits for private individuals had 
associated costs for the entire economy. Market interventions in particular resulted in 
the diversion of resources to the controlled sectors in an attempt to capture the benefits 
and escape the costs of such interventions. A vicious circle of controls, rent seeking 
and evasion developed. Rent seeking and evasion occurred because of controls. These 
activities resulted in a waste of resources and the government responded by a further 
tightening of controls which intensified illegal activities and so on.
Government market intervention created economic environments which generated rents. 
The rents were both economically valuable and politically useful. They are political 
resources used to build political support and control. Public expenditure programmes 
financed state-owned enterprises which supply basic utilities at low prices and support 
food subsidies that benefit the politically active or the urban population. Subsidies 
often resulted from policies of providing cheap goods to urban consumers, especially 
food to maintain political stability. In this sort of situation, individuals expended
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resources to become an exception to controls or to profit from them. For example, 
individuals who failed to secure supplies at official prices and who could afford to pay 
the higher free market prices resorted to the free market and paid the full value for 
these commodities. The beneficiaries then are the importers or those in charge of 
distributing the commodities. The public officials or the agency may appropriate the 
rent to themselves by accepting bribes in return for agency appointments to retail the 
commodities. Export farmers used competing marketing channels to avoid the 
depredations of the state (Bates, 1981). They marketed outside the official agency by 
selling illegally to neighbouring countries where official prices were better since they 
were paid in convertible currency. The persons or agencies empowered to prevent 
such cross-border trade had an opportunity to share in the rent.
A schematic representation of how the system worked is provided in Figure 3.1. The 
state is both a rent-generating and rent-allocating agent. It seeks revenue from taxation 
and subordinates policy to buying support from interest/tribal groups through economic 
regulation (eg. price intervention). Such intervention generates profits/rents. The 
attempts to capture the rents results in unproductive activity (eg. lobbying for chits) 
by both politicians and their supporters. Revenues from taxation and the rents make 
up the total available resources in the economy - the "pot". Resources were spent on 
obtaining a larger share of a given "pot" than on the productive pursuits that enlarged 
the size of the "pot", which diminished the size of the "pot". What makes matters
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worse is that the state itself is a rent-seeker. Its predatory policies extracted the 
surpluses of export producers and consumers.
Thus, government market intervention which generated rents and the allocation of such 
rents were all parts of the political economy of rent-seeking in Sierra Leone.
3.2 Controls and Sources of Rent Seeking
Rent seeking in Sierra Leone is a result of control of economic activity by the 
government. Price setting of goods, subsidies, attempts to ration foreign exchange and 
import bans have had a counter-productive effect in the economy. It resulted in the 
diversion of substantial resources to compete for the excess profit that accrued to the 
controlled commodities. An extensive parallel economy flourished in the midst of 
controls and the official economy shrunk. It is thought that 75 percent of the economy 
operated outside official channels. In this section, an overview of the main areas of 
controls and policy intervention in the economy is provided. These controls are 
grouped under the headings of goods market controls and external sector controls 
following a similar classification in Mohammad and Whalley (1984).
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3.2.1 Goods M arket Controls
Government intervention in imported consumer goods ranges from setting official retail 
prices, increasing supply through importation and organising distribution channels. 
But given excess demand, only limited supplies are available from official sources at 
the low prices. Additional supplies are obtainable at higher prices from the free 
market where commodities resell at a premium in excess of 100 percent.
Intervention in local food crops is much more limited. Purchase and sale is handled 
by the private sector. Government intervention is limited to setting official producer 
prices and organising distribution. But low producer prices have resulted in low 
purchases by the government agency since producers have sold to private itinerant 
traders who paid higher farm gate prices.
3.2.2 External Sector Controls
The main trade policy instruments are import tariffs, export duties and quantitative 
restrictions on imports and exports. Quantitative restrictions occur either in the form 
of import and export bans on particular commodities, or specific licenses required for 
the import or export of given commodities.
The main objective behind controls in the early 1980's on exports was to increase the
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amount of foreign exchange available to the official system for allocation to priority 
sectors, while import controls were designed to raise revenue for the government rather 
than to protect domestic industry. Import and export regulations were frequently 
changed during the period.
Overvaluation of the exchange rate by domestic policies has been pervasive in the 
economy up to the early 1980's. The overvalued exchange rate provided an implicit 
subsidy to urban consumers who now buy cheaper imported food and those individuals 
who had access to foreign exchange since they paid less for foreign exchange than it 
would cost at a market rate of exchange with local currency.
In the absence of effective controls and since costs are minimal, a parallel underground 
market for illegal foreign exchange transactions developed where the price is higher. 
The domestic cost of imports reflected the black market rate for foreign exchange as 
are domestic prices. The depreciated black market rate encouraged smuggling of both 
agricultural and mineral exports. At the same time, imports above the officially 
approved levels were smuggled in at higher black market costs which were passed on 
to consumers. An extensive parallel market in goods and foreign exchange thus 
developed.
From 1983, the government addressed problems of the declining economy through 
exchange rate adjustments. In December 1982, the leone was linked to the US dollar
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instead of the Special Drawing Right (SDR) and a dual exchange rate system was 
introduced which involved an effective devaluation of 50% of the leone. Depending 
on the type of activity or use of foreign exchange, the official or commercial rate was 
applied. The modification of the exchange rate was with a view to improve the 
balance of payments situation as well as curtail the large scale smuggling in the 
country. The measure was inflationary and prices of basic essentials (including rice) 
rose as well as other imports. (Inflation averaged about 75% in the first half of the 
1980s, see Table 3.1). Importers who obtained foreign exchange at the lower rates to 
import goods were selling their products at the higher rates resulting in huge profits. 
A vicious circle developed. A parallel market existed because of perception of 
overvaluation of the currency by the trading community due to the existence of large 
payment deficits and a severe shortage of foreign exchange. This, in turn, discouraged 
the inflow of export earnings into the banking system and encouraged parallel market 
transactions. Thus, excessive demand for foreign exchange, capital flight and the 
growth of parallel markets in foreign currency were consequences of foreign exchange 
controls.
Given the futility of continuous adjustments in the face of an increasing parallel market 
premium, the government introduced a freely floating exchange rate system in June 
1986 in the context of an agreed adjustment programme with the IMF. The adjustment 
measures resulted in a considerable erosion in living standards and have intensified 
parallel market activities in retail trade and foreign exchange. In the hope of
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dampening illicit trade in commodities, the government banned the import of 
merchandise not paid for with currency obtained at a commercial bank. Despite these 
measures, the government was on the whole unsuccessful in bringing the extensive 
"parallel economy" under control during the period.
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Table 3.1 Imported Rice Prices . Exchange Rates and Cost of Living Index, 1979-1989
Years Official
Price
(Le/Bag)
Free Market
Price
(Le/Bag)
Official
Exch.
Rate (Period
average
Le/US$)
Black/Parall
el
Market
Exch.
Rate
(Le/US$)
Cost of 
Living 
Index (1978 
= 100)
Annual
Percentage
Change
1978 21.50 _ 1.06 1.11 130 13.0
1980 21.50 - 1.05 1.40 161 23.8
1981 25.20 30.00 1.16 1.70 204 26.7
1982 28.00 35.00 1.24 1.90 342 67.6
1983 45.00 50.00 1.89 3.40 573 67.5
1984 60.00 85.00 2.51 4.30 1011 76.4
1985 70.00 150.00 5.09 7.70 1829 80.9
1986 85/1708 270/500b 16.09 27.08 5097 178.7
1987 350 800/1000 34.04 100.00 14,200 178.6
1988 - - 32.51 131.61 18,840 32.7
1989 - - 59.81 180.90 30,666 62.8
NOTES
data not available 
a price data refer to average prices in Urban Freetown,
b price raised in the second-half of the year
c inflation measured by the Freetown cost of living index on a calendar basis.
SOURCES:
1. Price data are from various reports of surveys of outlets in Urban Freetown.
2. Official Exchange Rates from International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1993, International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.).
3. Black I Parallel Exchange Rate are from World Currency Yearbook, 1985, International Currency Analysis, Inc., Brooklyn, 
N.Y. and African Development Indicators,1992, The World Bank, Washington D.C..
4. Cost of Living Index extracted from Weeks, 1992, Table 4.2, pp. 46.
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3.2.3 Control of Export Crops
The marketing channels and domestic producer prices of exports are determined by an 
officially state-controlled Marketing Board. Under this marketing system, producers must sell 
their crops to the agency at official prices lower than the prevailing world price. The 
revenues generated from the export tax were initially used to assist in the development of the 
agricultural industry. However, as the economy deteriorated and inflation soared, the export 
tax revenues were diverted to finance the purchase of consumer imports and to support food 
subsidies for the urban elite.
Throughout the 1980s, the producer price shares for coffee (Table 3.2) have been consistently 
low. (The producer price shares for other exports seem to have exhibited similar trends during 
the period). This implicit taxation of export crop producers contributed to the decline in 
official purchases since low official producer prices discouraged area expansion, the uptake 
of innovations, and increased smuggling given better prices in neighbouring countries. 
Despite the substantial increase in producer prices announced during 1983/84 to 1985/86, the 
agency recorded only a small increase in purchases, since prices still remained depressed in 
real terms even though competitive with neighbouring countries.
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Table 3.2 Coffee: Prices and Producer Price Shares. 1979-1989
Years a b c d = bxc c = a/d
1979 1.89 372.90 1.11 4.13 0.46
1980 1.76 331.56 1.40 4.64 0.38
1981 1.32 254.80 1.70 4.33 0.30
1982 1.43 276.34 1.90 5.25 0.27
1983 3.80 281.47 3.40 9.56 0.39
1984 5.29 310.73 4.30 13.36 0.39
1985 8.82 293.63 7.70 22.60 0.39
1986 52.91 374.62 27.80 101.45 0.52
1987 52.91 236.10 100.00 236.10 0.22
1988 52.91 253.24 131.61 333.28 0.16
1989 70.55 200.86 180.90 363.35 0.19
Notes
a is the nominal / official producer price (Leone/Kg),
b is the world price of Brazillian coffee (US cents / Kg quoted in N.Y. (conversion
factor 1 Kg = 2.2 lbs), 
c is the official exchange rate (period average),
e is the producer price share, defined as the ratio of the nominal producer price to
the product of (b) and (c).
Sources: For all the nominal / official producer price, the world price and the
parallel exchange rate, see data sources in Table 6.1 (a), pp. 107. Others 
are author’s computation.
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3.3 Rent Seeking in Rice - A Case Study
3.3.1 Rice Trade and Price Policies
Rice is the main staple food crop consumed by all age groups in Sierra Leone. It is the 
nutritional well-being of the poor (a substantial proportion of the population). In the mid- 
1970’s it accounted for over 50% of the total food availability in the country and is grown 
by over 85% of the total farming population. (In addition, subsidiary food crops such as 
cassava, maize, ground nuts, etc. are also grown). The development of the rice sector is, 
therefore, of vital importance to the economy of Sierra Leone since the extent of foreign 
exchange reserves and the size of the budget deficit hinges around the price of rice.
By the late 1970’s, the agricultural growth rate (-0.54% per annum) was less than the growth 
rate of the population (2.7% per annum) and food imports began to rise sharply. Between 
1962 and 1970, production of rice increased by 7.5 percent per annum, but this increase 
occurred from a low base, necessitating a growth in rice imports of 18.2 percent per annum 
to meet the needs of a growing population. Population growth accelerated some what during 
the decade of the 1970’s which, coupled with a decline in both domestic production and 
imports, led to a decrease in recorded per capita consumption of rice. Since then, per capita 
rice consumption has declined from a high of 125 kg/cap/year in 1979 to 98.2 kg/cap/year 
in 1990.
In the mid 1980’s, the government increased the flow of subsidised credit to rice imports and 
its imports have been supplemented by sale of concessionary food aid (eg. PL 480 and EEC
rice). Three factors have been responsible for the large increase in rice imports: (a) the 
profitability of rice imports to the responsible agency which, unlike private traders, had both 
the monopoly and the access to foreign exchange; (b) the combined impact of successive 
crop failures and declining domestic production; and (c) the low producer prices paid to rice 
farmers which resulted in a substitution to other root or tree crops. Rice imports were 
mainly targeted at urban consumers who benefitted through subsidized prices.3
Government intervention in the marketing of rice started when the Sierra Leone Rice 
Corporation (SLRC) was set up in 1965. The mandate of the corporation was to organize 
production, processing and distribution of domestic rice, with intermittent imports during 
years of shortages. The stated objectives of policy was to encourage increases in rice 
production by providing stable and remunerative prices to farmers while ensuring adequate 
supplies of good quality rice to consumers.
Data on rice marketing in Sierra Leone is scanty but the available figures for purchases show 
that during its existence (1965 - 1979), SLRC bought an insignificant proportion of domestic 
rice. Much of the domestic rice was marketed by private itinerant traders who were able to 
compete effectively with the corporation by offering better prices than those paid by it to 
farmers. The rise in producer prices in 1975 had the effect of making the corporation 
competitive in the domestic market. It was able to purchase enough domestic rice such that
3Whereas the shortfall in production is' explained by the above factors, the sharp rise in imports 
were due to a combination of increases in demand due to demographic changes and 
reexportation (through smuggling) to neighbouring countries where better prices were paid.
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an insignificant amount of rice (less than 500T) was imported in that year.4 Thus, Sierra 
Leone was self-sufficient in rice for those intervening years.
The corporation handled all imports of rice which it sold to licensed wholesale merchants 
at fixed retail prices. The prices were fixed to allow the corporation a large market margin 
which was subsequently reduced in the later year of its operation. The agents were expected 
to resell the rice at prices recommended by the corporation. But once the rice left the 
warehouses of the corporation, it had no control over the prices at which it was sold. The 
available series on retail prices indicate that consumer paid higher market prices in the free 
market above those recommended by the corporation. Due to import restrictions and lack 
of control over prices, urban retail prices have been kept at a consistently higher level.
In the late 1970’s, government minimum controlled prices on rice provided the corporation 
a small market margin. With high operating costs, the corporation incurred huge financial 
losses which, coupled with mismanagement, led to its liquidation in 1979. Following the 
closure of SLRC, its activities were transferred to the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board 
(SLPMB).5 In spite of these organisational changes, no fundamental change in rice 
marketing and policy actually occurred. The official purchase price of domestic rice offered 
by the board continued to be set very low and was not supported by the government as a
4It is important to note that urban consumers benefitted from government intervention in 
the rice market not through a price subsidy per se. but through exchange rate policy. 
Domestic selling prices were determined by converting the CIF values of imported rice to 
domestic currency using the official exchange rate, rather than the parallel rate, thereby 
effectively underpricing rice to consumers (Weeks, 1992).
5Some observers argue that the fall in rice imports is due to a reduction in domestic demand due 
to the higher domestic prices of rice.
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flow price. To secure low prices for rice, the Board diverted its export tax revenues for the 
subsidisation of rice imports at the expense of export producer prices.6 In early 1989, lack 
of funds for procurement led to suspension of all domestic rice purchases. Instead, the board 
concentrated its efforts on imports of rice because of their high profitability and their low 
overhead cost.
The Board’s import prices had an effect on its intervention prices for domestic rice. The 
available data show that between 1979 - 1982, like its predecessor, the Board bought an 
insignificant quantity of domestic rice due to lower producer prices. The domestic rice trade 
continued to be dominated by private traders who paid higher prices to farmers. To ensure 
that consumers benefited from the subsidies * the Board increased supplies to urban centres 
through appointed rice agents who sold the rice at prices determined by a Rice Committee 
Chaired by the President.7 Thus, between 1980 and 1985, the retail price of rice changed 
gradually from Le30 to Le70 per bag over the period (see Table 3.1). However, the Board 
did not have much success in controlling supplies. The existence of excess demand at home 
and in neighbouring countries and because the commodity is transferable, resulted in supplies 
being diverted into black markets where higher than market prices were paid. Thus, parallel 
markets consequently grew alongside official markets. Consumers whose demand is more 
than satisfied at official prices resold the excess in free markets at higher prices. In 1986, 
for example, with the floatation of the leone and the partial removal of the subsidy on rice,
6The SLPMB also dominated export of cash crops. Until 1990, the marketing board was 
the sole exporter of cocoa, coffee and palm kernels.
7This is a sub-committee of the cabinet set up to do a regular review of the price of 
imported rice and the establishment of appropriate institutional arrangement for its 
distribution.
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this pushed up the free market retail prices to almost three times the official levels with 
alarming increases in the cost of living.
Since official prices did not allocate supplies and given the problems of distribution through 
rice agents, the government introduced additional supplies by issuing quotas to politicians, 
Senior military, corporate bodies and institutions. The politicians were to resell the rice at 
government recommended prices by issuing rice chits.8
3.3.2 Identifying Rent Seekers
The existence of parallel markets alongside official markets for rice generated rents for those 
who secured the rice in bulk from agents or politicians. This is expected to generate rent 
seeking for rice supplies and chits.
The burst of rent seeking activities for rice supplies and chits during the period usually 
occurred in the first and last week of each month. During these periods, the offices of 
politicians, senior civil servants, and senior military and the SLPMB were filled with crowds 
of individuals looking for rice chits or supplies. Those who had formed personalised 
relationships with members of the Board Management or politicians were assured of monthly 
rations. This, in essence, suggests that the authorised rice agents and politicians shared the 
rent generated with middlemen (mainly market traders) who paid for the chits and resold at 
the higher free market price. Such benefits from rents on subsidised rice attracted a large
8The rice "chit" was an authority to pay for a specified number of bags of rice for quantities 
ranging from two bags and upwards.
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number of individuals to the retail trade in rice during the period, especially those in official 
government employment.
The wage earning class counted among the poorer sections of urban society in Sierra Leone. 
Following the adjustment measures adopted in the early and mid-1980’s, public and private 
sector salaries were increased several times (see Table 3.4). These increases, however, did 
not compensate for the rapid increases in the cost of living. Thus, wage earners lost real 
income in the mid-1980’s to the extent that the average wage income would have consigned 
an urban family to the deepest poverty (Weeks, 1992). For example, in 1986, the average 
family would have exhausted it monthly wage on a bag of rice alone. As a result, most 
Sierra Leoneans in formal employment in urban areas were forced to supplement their 
incomes in any way they can including parallel market retail trading in controlled 
commodities, moonlighting and other illicit activities. They left their formal employment 
to spend time in offices of politicians and senior civil servants in search of chits for rice and 
other controlled commodities. There are no recorded data on rent seekers but the numbers 
of individuals involved in these activities must have been very high during the period. It is 
common to find members of the professional classes (teachers, nurses, junior civil servants), 
informal sector entrepreneurs, school kids and university students competing for chits for 
rice and other controlled commodities from those who issued them. Hence, rent seeking 
activity diverted labour, time and effort from productive pursuits into unproductive activities. 
This must have imposed huge costs on the economy.
In the late 1980’s and 1990’s, following an IMF stabilisation programme, domestic prices 
have been freed, the import trade (including rice) has been liberalised and the exchange rate
is now market-determined. The liberalisation of rice import trade has opened the rent- 
seeking process to intense competition and reduced profit margins. The official market has 
been eliminated as have rice shortages. The queues for rice and chits have since disappeared 
with its associated unproductive activity.
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Table 3.3 Production, Import and Per Capita Consumption of Rice. 1961-
1990JW0_MI1
Year Paddy Milled
Rice
Equiv.a
Imports
Total
Supply
Pop.
(’000’)
Per
Cap.
Cons.
(kg)
1961 264.0 150.3 4.2 154.5 1,383 111.7
1962 270.0 154.1 27.3 181.4 2,033 89.2
1963 315.0 179.4 21.0 200.4 2,084 96.2
1964 331.0 188.5 0.5 189.0 2,136 88.5
1965 373.0 212.4 12.9 225.3 2,189 102.9
1966 399.0 227.2 35.1 262.3 2,244 116.9
1967 434.0 247.2 24.2 271.4 2,300 118.0
1968 468.0 226.5 17.2 283.7 2,358 120.3
1969 426.0 242.6 12.6 255.2 2,417 150.6
1970 507.0 288.7 44.8 333.5 2,477 134.6
1971 458.0 260.8 27.5 288.3 2,539 133.5
1972 500.0 284.8 5.2 290.0 2,603 111.4
1973 477.0 271.7 43.7 315.4 2,668 118.2
1974 473.0 269.4 45.0 314.4 2,735 115.0
1975 479.0 272.3 5.0 272.8 2,803 97.3
1976 620.0 325.4 15.0 340.4 2,890 117.8
1977 641.0 336.4 6.7 343.1 2,970 115.5
1978 641.0 336.4 22.7 359.1 3,053 117.6
1979 599.0 314.4 76.5 390.9 3,138 124.6
1980 556.0 291.8 44.5 336.3 3,225 104.3
1981 523.5 274.8 73.2 348.0 3,315 105.0
1982 523.5 274.8 70.7 345.5 3,407 101.4
1983 460.0 241.5 36.2 227.7 3,502 79.3
1984 504.1 264.6 103.7 368.3 3,600 102.3
1985 428.0 224.6 118.3 342.9 3,700 92.7
1986 525.0 275.6 67.7 343.3 3,803 90.3
1987 547.9 287.6 75.5 363.1 3,909 92.9
1988 473.1 248.3 120.1 368.4 4,108 89.7
1989 517.8 271.8 123.7 395.5 4,222 93.7
1990 543.7 285.0 141.1 426.1 4,339 98.2
Sotes
a Based on 5% need, 15% postharvest loss, and 65% milling recovery rate.
Sources: From 1961-1975, data from Sierra Leone, Agricultural Sector Review, 1984;
1976-1990, data from Department of Agriculture and Forestry.
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Table 3.4 Minimum Nominal Wage Levels of Selected Occupations, 1976-
1986
(Leones per day)
YEAR
OCCUPATION
1976 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
AGRICULTURE
Artisan I
Artisan II 1.54 2.29 3.12 3.12 3.12 3.12 6.14 12.14
Labourers 1.34 2.09 2.92 2.92 2.92 2.92 5.94 11.94
Watchman 0.99 1.74 2.57 2.57 3.59 3.59 5.59 11.59
Clerical 0.99 1.74 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 5.59 11.59
MANUFACTURI­
NG AND 
INDUSTRIAL
1.66 2.41 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 6.26 12.26
Artisan I
Artisan II 2.03 3.48 3.55 4.26 4.26 5.98 8.85 11.34
Labourers 1.79 3.24 3.30 3.97 3.97 5.70 7.87 11.20
Watchman 1.36 2.82 2.86 3.43 3.43 4.97 7.01 9.57
Clerical (per 1.36 2.82 2.86 3.43 3.43 4.97 6.90 9.33
month) 48.44 87.48 89.10 113.40 115.6 139.92 302.4
Source: Longhurst, R. et al (1987), Structural Adjustment and Vulnerable Groups in
Sierra Leone. (Report prepared for UNICEF). Table 3.6, p.35.
49
3.4 Early Impact of Economic Reforms
The implementation of macroeconomic policies under the reform programme has been 
particularly successful. The overall budget deficit was reduced from 12.0 percent of GDP 
in 1989/90 to 9.3 percent in 1991/92. Due to lower bank borrowing to finance the budget 
deficit, the rate of increase in money supply has slowed down considerably. The rate of 
inflation has declined sharply, from 115 percent in 1991 to 35 percent in 1992. Interest rates 
have fallen sharply in line with inflation, although positive in real terms. The exchange rate 
remained stable in the second half of 1992, while the differential between the commercial 
bank rate and the parallel rate narrowed to less than 5 percent. In real effective terms, the 
official exchange rate, which is calculated on the basis of the rate ruling in the commercial 
bank market, depreciated by 9 percent between the second quarter of 1990 when the market- 
determined exchange rate system was adopted, and the second quarter of 1992.
The implementation of the structural adjustment elements of the programme (Table 3.5) is 
also beginning to have an impact. Availability of essential products such as fuel and rice has 
improved significantly. This has contributed to the sharp slow-down in the rate of inflation. 
The shortage of foreign exchange in the official system has eased considerably and has 
reduced the premium on foreign exchange transactions. Liberalisation of prices and trade 
has resulted in significant increases in cash crop farmers’ incomes. With the SLPMB now 
closed down, all coffee and cocoa exports are handled by the private traders who purchase 
these crops at any price from producers. This measure increased producers’ price share to 
about 90 percent and 70 percent of f.o.b prices, respectively, as compared to less than 50 
percent in the late 1980s. Price reform has thus raised producer prices and squeezed out
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rents previously existing. However, it is not clear whether the recent increases in GDP is 
due to a redirection of resources from unproductive activities to productive uses following 
the reforms.
Table 3.5 Selected Indicators of Structural Adjustment
1980/81 1984/85 1991/92
Real effective exchange rate: 
Index 1980=100
104 208 75
Ratio of parallel market to official exchange rate 0.93 3.02 1.17
SLPMB procurement price for cocoa as share of selling
price (%) 101 21 90
Ratio of domestic gasoline price/
international price at parallel market exchange rate — 0.74 2.13
Real interest rate:
Short-term deposit rate (6 months) (%) -13.4 -60.4 -22.9
Lending rate* (%) -7.4 -51.4 -5.54
Broad money as share of GDP ( % ) 20.0 17.9 12.4
Major exports (1980/81 =  100)
Diamonds (Carats) 100 100 78
Cocoa (’000 tons) 100 123 72
Coffee (’000 tons) 100 81 46
Notes
a- Average of lending rates charged by commercial banks 
Sources: Bank of Sierra Leone and Central Statistics Office
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Chapter 4
ANALYSIS OF THE RICE MARKET
4.1 Description of Structure and Distribution Channels
To implement price controls on subsidised imported rice, the government appointed public 
agencies to purchase and distribute the commodity. It was hoped that with a controlled 
distribution, the rice would be available to all sections of the population at the subsidised 
prices. During the late 1960s and late 1970s, the Rice Corporation was set up to handled 
the purchase and distribution of both domestic and imported rice. But in the absence of strict 
controls on sales of imported rice, and the inability by government to enforce controlled 
prices, the rice was resold in free markets at higher market prices. In this situation, those 
charged with the responsibility of distribution conferred the rice (and associated profits) to 
themselves or to others who paid them bribes. In cases where enforcement was perceived 
to be effective, hoarding or smuggling of the commodity to neighbouring countries was a 
common response thus pushing prices still higher.
In the next two sections, we describe the distribution methods that have been utilised for 
imported rice to highlight how public programs create vested interests in policies of social 
reform since the inception of price controls in Sierra Leone.
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4.1.1 The Distribution Method of the Rice Corporation
Between 1965 and 1979, imported rice was handled exclusively by the Rice Corporation. 
In the absence of annual crop surveys and/or production forecasts, the corporation decided 
on the amount of imports by a simple guess of the expected shortfall in domestic production 
against domestic demand.
The imported rice was sold primarily to licensed wholesale itinerant agents at official 
wholesale prices. The wholesale merchants were expected to resell to retailers in urban 
areas at fixed retail prices determined by the Board. To ensure a wider distribution, the 
corporation also sold directly to retailers in urban areas from its stores in Freetown who 
resold to consumers in public markets in small volume measures such as the ten ounce butter 
container. The corporation similarly distributed the small proportion of domestic rice that 
it bought from local farmers. It was hoped that this method of sales would lead to a wider 
distribution that would guarantee consumers benefitted from the subsidised prices.
But once the rice left the corporation stores, they had no control over where and for what 
price it was traded. In most cases, it was retraded in a free market in urban areas at higher 
than market determined prices. For example, the results of an FAO Team survey on the 
retail prices in 1970 reported in GSL (1987) indicated that whereas the corporation had 
allowed agents in Freetown a profit margin of 7.5% after handling and transportation costs, 
the actual gross margin was 12.5%. The higher demand for agency appointments and the 
pressure for increased quota allocations by agents was a direct result of these high profit 
margins rather than to reflect a wider distribution. Thus, it appears that profit seeking or
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rent seeking in an effort to secure subsidised commodities has been around since the 
inception of administered pricing in Sierra Leone.
The Rice Corporation was liquidated in April 1979 following administrative and financial 
difficulties. The government subsequently turned to another public agency to purchase and 
distribute imported rice - the Sierra Leone Product Marketing Board (SLPMB). The 
distribution methods used by SLPMB are discussed next.
4.1.2 The Distribution Method of the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB)
The SLPMB, in addition to the export monopsony it had for cash crops, replaced the Rice 
Corporation as the agency responsible for purchasing and distributing rice imports. It faced 
similar difficulties in distributing rice the rice and the rice never reached targeted groups. 
Like its predecessor before it, the Rice Corporation, the SLPMB initially appointed rice 
agents to sell rice throughout the country. It had about 400 agents with each receiving an 
allocation of 40 bags for every selling centre. Each agent was issued with a Rice Purchasing 
Authority (RPA) commonly known as a "Chit" from the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
which was then exchanged for the allocated quantities of rice from the SLPMB. The system 
was misused by many since most of the politically appointed agents did not have the required 
capital outlay to pay for the allocated quotas from SLPMB. Such agents were known to 
resell their RPAs for anything between Le50 to Le80 per bag in the mid-1980s. This method 
of distribution saw the rise of middlemen in rice distribution in huge numbers. The 
middlemen who got supplies from agents meant for rural areas diverted these to urban and 
mining centres where demand is high or smuggle the commodity into neighbouring countries
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for hard currency. These distributional problems meant that rice could only be obtained by 
most consumers from the open market at higher prices. It was common to find entire 
members of a family queuing at official retail outlets to secure rice only to resell the same 
in the open market. Every individual subsequently became a rice dealer of some sort to 
secure high profits.
Given these problems with agents and to alleviate distribution difficulties, the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry in 1986 devised a new distribution mechanism to reflect a wider 
distribution in an attempt to shut off middlemen. In particular, the new mechanism was to 
include direct allocation to employees of all private and governmental organisations including 
provincial administrative regions. (See Table 4.1 and the diagrammatic illustration in 
Figure 4.1).
As Table 4.1 shows, monthly allocations of rice were issued not only to rice agents but also 
to institutions, ministries, etc. for their employees and buying agents of export produce.9 
In 1986, there were about 50 agents in the capital city Freetown alone with each receiving 
50 bags daily for the various official retail centres which were later increased from 5 to 14. 
It was hoped that this system of distribution would eradicate middlemen and that the rice 
would now reach targeted groups. It turned out that the system led to an increasing number 
of middlemen in search of chits. As Figure 4.1 makes clear, only employees of private and 
governmental institutions were assured of an allocation at the official price that did not pass
9These allocations were decided by a Rice Committee comprising of President-Chairman, 
Ministers of Economic Ministries, Labour Officials, senior civil servants, Aid representatives, 
etc.
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through a middleman. All other links in the distribution chain provided rents for middlemen 
and those who secured RPAs. For example, senior army personnel were known to receive 
huge quantities of rice monthly far in excess of their consumption needs. These surpluses 
found their way into the open market via middlemen. In the case of MPs, it was common 
practice for most to resell their chits to middlemen for their entire constituency quotas or a 
significant part thereof to supplement their low incomes. GSL (1987) estimated that the cost 
of rice to the final consumer was in excess of 64% above the subsidised price. Above all, 
and rather conspicuously, the allocations to the Armed Forces (a privileged group) was very 
heavily subsidised - they paid Le85/bag when official retail prices surged to between Lel70- 
Le340/bag. This became a lucrative source of rents for rice dealers. All in all, it appears 
that whatever system of distribution that was devised, it only intensified rent-seeking activity 
for rice chits by middlemen. In the next section, we describe the nature of the transactions 
in each chain of the distribution mechanism illustrated in Figure 4.1:
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FIG 4.1 Institutional Mechanisms for the Distribution of Imported Rice
(sole Importer)
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Table 4.1 Allocations Approved by the Rice Committee. (1986) (50kg bags)
Institution May 1986 June 1986
Army 8160 8660
Police 7352 7352
Prisons 2600 2600
Mining Companies 6800 6800
Embassies etc. 1317 1317
Hospitals 1830 1830
Government ministries (Western 
Area)
13055 13055
Hotels 595 631
Industries 1796 1796
Banks 1490 1490
Government ministries (in Provinces) 3000 3000
Other institutions 9635 10348
SLPMB departments 14642 14500
Private concerns 4200 4200
Personnel of other Gov't institutions 3081 3081
Western Area agents 50395 50425
Provincial agents 52200 52200
"Standing Quotas" 9100 9100
TOTAL 191,248 192,355
Source: GSL (1987), "Rice Marketing and Pricing Policy in Sierra Leone", December
1987, pp. 69-70.
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4.2 N ature of Transactions in the Distribution Process
Using the institutional mechanism described above for subsidised commodity, we now 
consider the nature of the competitive bidding in the "chit" system. But first, we 
emphasise that there is a free market for rice where individuals can buy or sell any 
number of units. In particular, the price of rice clears on the resale market. There are 
two implications given the existence of a free market:
(i) any individual can buy rice if he is willing to pay the higher market price, and
(ii) individuals with "chits" received a rent equal to the difference between the
i
market clearing price and the official price plus the cost of the chit. But for such 
individuals, they may either choose to sell their chits and capture the rent in cash or 
they may consume the rent if they got the rice and consumed the commodity 
themselves. For example, whereas the official controlled price of rice in early 1986 
was Le85 per bag, the free market price was Le270 per bag. Thus, the value of the 
rent from a controlled unit of rice was worth L e i85 - the equivalent of about a month's
59
wages for low level government employees in that year. Given the extent of such 
profit margins, it is little wonder that there was intensive lobbying to secure "chits" 
from all sections of the population.10
We note, however, that the allocations awarded to institutions and departments was the 
only distribution that played a socially useful function - a low level of effort was 
required to secure these allocations. In all other cases, especially the allocations going 
to the politically favoured and rice agents in particular, it involved lobbying type 
activity that is socially wasteful.
In general, the nature of the transactions for all the flows into the free market were 
similar. The agents/middlemen who acquired the chits or rice from whatever source 
paid a premium per bag on the total units allocated. These in turn resold the chit for 
a higher premium above any costs incurred direct to petty wholesalers. The petty 
wholesalers would pay for the rice from SLPMB which they now sell to retailers, the 
final link in the chain before the rice reaches the consumer. The system was such that 
the chit or each unit of rice obtained secured a premium each time it changes hands 
at every stage. There was "rent sharing" between those who received the initial 
allocations and their subsidiaries. The consumers had to pay for all the additional 
premiums in the final price they were offered in the free market. Allocations to
10The incentives to engage in rent-seeking depends on the extent to which prevailing price 
do not reflect the scarcity value of goods and services as it happened in the case of rice
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friends, constituents and those who received direct supplies were a means of building 
organized political support. These allocations did not normally involve cash 
transactions.
4.3 Rationing of Rice in the Controlled Sectors
Rent seeking in Sierra Leone is primarily a result of governmental controls in the 
goods market. The government controls the prices of several important categories of 
commodities such as rice, sugar, flour, kerosene, fuel, cement, building materials, etc. 
In general, the government subsidises consumption of these commodities by selling 
them to consumers at a lower price than that ruling in the free market mainly in large 
urban centres. The original purpose is to lower the cost of living and improve the 
quality of life of the poor in urban areas. However, the subsidy has benefited only the 
few individuals that received the subsidised commodities and others have to resort to 
the open market where the same goods can be obtained at higher cash prices. The 
differential premium between the lower cost subsidised goods and the higher free 
market cash prices has resulted in individuals expending resources to get government 
allocations of goods sold at the lower price with a substantial cost to society.
In the rice sector, rationing was by two methods:
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(a) waiting in a queue at a controlled centre, and
(b) allocation to politicians who resell by issuing chits to their agents or preferred 
individuals.
Both methods involved the waste of resources through rent seeking - waiting costs or 
lobbying type activity. However, in addition to the rationed sectors, there was a free 
market for rice where supplies from the controlled sectors where diverted. In the free 
market, rice was resold at higher cash prices and there was no waiting.
The following sections discuss the rationing methods in rice allocation to show how 
individuals self-select themselves amongst the different sectors of the rice market. We 
also analyse the effects that price controls have on consumer welfare in the queue and 
compute the associated welfare costs of waiting in the different sectors of the market. 
But first, we consider the type of rent-seeking activity that was undertaken to get 
subsidised rice.
4.3.1 Type of Rent-Seeking Activity
The difference between the higher free market prices (what people will pay) and low 
official prices (what the rice actually costs) is rent to whoever got the subsidised rice. 
Such rents (and they where high during the period) can be expected to attract rent-
seeking behaviour. Individuals expended resources in the form of search, bribes and 
establishing contacts with politicians in an attempt to obtain rice or to increase the 
quantity that they got. Further, because of restriction on imports which limited 
supplies, excess demand for rice increased rent-seeking activity.
In India, overinstallation of capacity or excess labour hiring was associated with rent- 
seeking to get import licenses. However, in Sierra Leone, the more common method 
of competition is through waiting time (incurring time costs) either in line at a 
distribution centre or in a politician's office. For example, individuals with a low value 
of time stood in line longer, acquire more than their needs and resell the excess to 
individuals with a higher value of time. In the chit system, the right to benefit from 
the price differential is given to those allocated the chit. The need to acquire a chit, 
given its huge associated profits, encouraged individuals to devote large amounts of 
resources in waiting time in the offices of those who issue them. But since the chits 
were freely exchangeable for cash, the rich paid for these from those who got them by 
waiting at a price at least as high as the owners are willing to accept. But the costs 
of waiting in either sector are resources spent in the pursuit of a rent from rice 
allocation whose price is controlled by the government. These resources are a social 
loss since they do not result in additional output to society. The costs of rent seeking 
through search (waiting time costs) is therefore a real resource cost to the whole 
economy.
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In the next section, we show the equilibrium configuration in the rice market in the 
absence of government controls in prices and supplies. We then show how controls 
affect the equilibrium configuration, especially the free market price of imported rice.
4.4 Model of Consumer Behaviour With Rationing
4.4.1 Free Market With No Government Intervention
Suppose that the supply of rice is fixed at unit quantity. If there was no government 
intervention in the rice market (in terms of fixing prices), the supply and demand for 
rice in the free market is illustrated below:
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Figure 4.2 Free M arket Equilibrium  W ith No Intervention
s=i
p=i
Q u a n t i t y
With market-clearing prices, the price is set at price P = 1 such that the unit is sold 
if one consumer demands the good. Using the free market equilibrium, the consumer's 
valuation, v, (in terms of the cost of willingness to pay for the good) can be shown to 
be distributed between 0 and 2 as illustrated in the diagram below:
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We see (from Figure 4.2) that the consumer is willing to pay up to Le2 per unit for rice but 
is only paying Lei per unit (actual cost). The difference is his consumer surplus. But the 
government intervenes in the rice market and lowers the price P to Ps (the official or 
subsidised price). Since government imports are less than demand, there is excess demand 
for rice which causes shortages and necessitates the use of allocation schemes other than by 
cash payment.
In the following sections, we discuss the two rationing schemes that have been utilised in the 
rice market in Sierra Leone. Since rice was also sold in a free market, for ease of exposition, 
we analyse the different cases as:
(a) queue and free market only with no politician,
(b) queue and free market with a politician.
In (a) we consider rationing in the queue and exclude the chit system. Subsequently, we 
introduce the chit system and exclude supplies already gone to the queue.
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4.4.2 Rationing in Queue With No Politician
Suppose that the only official source of obtaining rice is from official rice agents in 
distribution centres or from the free market. We continue to assume that the supply is fixed 
at Q = 1 and controlled by the government.
We make the following additional simplifying assumptions:
(i) the free market operates costlessly alongside the official market with uniform prices, 
P, for all consumers. That is, there are no queues, search costs or penalties for 
dealing in the free market;
(ii) there are two groups of consumers - the rich and the poor with a different valuation 
v, for a unit of rice.
Let y units be the volume of rice sold in the official controlled centres.11 Since purchasing 
from the queue involved waiting, assume that I is the average queue time necessary to obtain 
supplies. The government fixes / so as to determine the "slowness" of distribution so as to 
achieve zero rationing. That is, the slowness of distribution ensures that supplies in the queue 
are exhausted by the last person in line.
nIn the controlled queues, consumers make limited purchases per visit in units of butter cups or 5kg 
packs. Hence, y is the total number of 5kg packs (for example) sold in the queue.
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Figure 4.3 Free Market Equilibrium With Queue
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The diagram shows that despite the lower subsidised price paid, waiting costs increase the 
total price to Ps + 11* where t is the opportunity cost of the last (yth) person who bought 
from the queue. In the new free market, the price is now higher than the free market price 
without intervention.
4.4.3 Consumer Welfare in the Queue
We have shown that because of the low cash price and the costs of waiting, the individuals 
who go to the queue are the poor with lower opportunity costs of time, t. The remaining 
consumers with a higher t and, therefore v, went to the free market because they are, by 
assumption, willing to pay higher cash prices. We now show the effects of price controls 
on consumer surplus for both sets of consumers - in the queue and free market.
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Further, let one unit of queuing time cost t, where t is the opportunity cost of waiting time. 
The opportunity costs of time is lower for the poor than the rich because the poor have a 
lower (implicit/explicit) hourly wage rate. We assume t and v are perfectly positively 
correlated so that the poor with a lower t have a lower v. One special interesting case we 
analyse below is t=v with t having the same distribution as v shown above.
The government by choice of Ps and / achieves queue equilibrium such that
Ps + t / *  = v  [4.1]
where the left hand side of [4.1] is the marginal cost of the last unit of rice sold in the queue 
and the right hand side is the marginal benefits of the last unit sold in the queue.
Given t and /*, an individual will join the queue if the subsidised price is fixed such that the 
marginal costs of acquiring rice is less than or equal to the marginal benefit. For example, 
if queuing time is fixed at unity, since v=t, an individual will not join the queue if Ps > 0 
since then all his surplus is exhausted in the queue.12 In general, since t=v, consumers with 
a lower v form the queue and the remaining consumers with a higher v and therefore t go 
immediately to the free market. Hence, the government by choice of Ps and I* allocate 
quantities in the queue such that poor consumers get the ration. The remaining supply for 
the free market (= 1-y) is sold at a new free market price (P > 1) higher than the market price 
without intervention. The new free market equilibrium with a queue is illustrated in the 
diagram below:
12For unit queuing time, he will join the queue only if Ps = 0. Therefore, we require 
that V <  1 since for V < 1  and t, the highest value of Ps then determines the individual’s 
decision to join the queue.
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Given that y units are sold in the queue, it implies that y individuals benefitted from these 
supplies. Suppose that the opportunity costs of time of these individuals lie between q and 
tj where is the opportunity costs of time of the last (yth) person in the queue. The 
distribution of the opportunity costs of time for these individuals is shown below:
f (t)
1
2 t0 t ,
The shaded area in the diagram above is the total costs of waiting in queue equilibrium. 
Hence, if the poorest individual has opportunity costs of waiting t = tl5 the corresponding 
costs for the last (yth) person13 is
t 2 = t j + y
13Since Ps is positive, we have excluded unemployed individuals with t = 0. Thus, only 
individuals with positive but low values of t benefitted from subsidies in the queue.
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To determine which individuals form the queue, we need to compute the surplus of the 
poorest and the last (yth) person. The surplus is defined as the marginal valuation minus 
total cash costs (cash price plus opportunity costs of time). In general, an individual joins 
the queue, if his surplus is zero or positive, that is, if his marginal valuation of rice is equal 
to or greater than the total marginal costs of rice. To illustrate, first calculate the surplus 
of the poorest person with lowest t = b in the queue with demand for rice at an 
infinitesimally small but positive quantities. For this individual,
v= Ps + t  1* *
defines his tj such that, since v 
with solution14
The surplus for the poorest individual, being the marginal person with v = tlf is by 
definition zero.
For the last (yth) person with opportunity cost ^  his surplus is
s = v - P s - t 2/ *
But v = t = t, + y and, therefore
s = ( t  , +y) - P ,  - ( t , +y) /  *
= t by assumption, 
*1 = + 1 1^
t . =  p °
14Queuing time must be less than unity, otherwise the solution is undefined.
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Using Ps above, we have that
s ( y) = y( 1 - I  *)
Hence, welfare of this bottom group (shown as shaded area in Figure 4.4 below) is
[ y 2( 1 -1 *)] 
2
yd-1*)]
W1 = fyJ s ( y) dy = fy y( 1 - /  *) dy =
J  y=0 J O
[ check: dwj =
[4.3]
[4.4]
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Figure 4.4 Consumer Surplus for the Poorest Group
Price
= y (1-1*)
S = 0
Quantity
y
Similarly, we can calculate the welfare loss of the rich gone to the new free market and paid 
higher cash prices. This is shown as the shaded area in Figure 4.5 below:
73
Figure 4.5 Consumer Surplus for the Rich
Price a
1+y
Quantity1-y 1
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The welfare loss in this case is made up of the loss in consumer surplus due to the higher 
price and the additional revenue for gone. Hence, the area of the trapezoid ABEDC is the 
total welfare loss computed as follows:
Welfare loss W2 = area of trapezoid ABEDC
= area of rectangle ABDC + area of triangle BDE 
= yd-y) + y2/2
= y - y2/2 [4.5]
Hence, for given Ps and /*, the benefit to consumers in queue with free market is the sum 
of the welfare change given by
, * [4-6]
In the expression for the sum of welfare change, the first term refers to the gains of the 
poor, and the second to the losses of the rich.
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4.4.3a Model Drawback
We have assumed in the above analysis the unrealistic but simple case of t= v  for ease of 
exposition. The more realistic case is t < v but t and v still positively correlated. For 
example in Equation [4.1], if fix queuing time to be unity, then t < v. This case has not 
been analysed here since we do not believe it will affect the basic results we have obtained 
here. It may, for example, increase the surplus of individuals for given t values.
4.4.4 Rationing in Queue with Politician
Suppose that in addition to sales in the queue, the government also allocates rice by issuing 
quotas to politicians. The original intention was to increase the spread of distribution to 
ensure that the rice subsidy reached more targeted groups of consumers. But given the 
benefits that accrued to those who got subsidised rice, the politicians realised that a rent was 
being offered them and they used it for their personal benefit. They either appropriated the 
rent themselves by reselling the entire quota in the free market or confer it upon others by 
giving them rations of the supplies (by issuing chits) received at the lower subsidised price 
for politicians. In the latter case, the politicians rewarded faithful supporters or friends by 
providing them privileged access to subsidised rice.
In general, the politicians resold the quota awarded them by charging a cash premium per 
bag of rice over and above the subsidised cost they paid. Those who got the chits (at the 
higher cash price) resold the same or the rice thereof at the higher free market price. In 
these circumstances, a chit became a valuable commodity since it provided a windfall to the
owner who bought rice at the lower cash price. Such windfall gains generated rent-seeking 
activity with individuals willing to devote a high level of effort (incurring time costs) in 
search of a chit from politicians. Compared to the queue, however, there was lesser waiting 
time at the politician since a lower number of consumers visited him due to a higher cash 
price which is above the government-subsidised price to consumers. To analyse the model 
in the case of the politician, consider the following scenario:
Suppose one politician has one bag offered for sale at price defined as:
PK = P 's +  K [4.7]
where PK is the price charged by the politician
P 's is the purchase price of the politician (set by government lower than Ps), 
and K is the cash premium per unit sold.
Depending on the politician’s objective(s) in appropriating the rent, he may face one of two 
types of constraints in fixing PK:
(a) Revenue Maximisation (hard upper bound).
In this case, he wishes to maximise his personal gain and he, therefore, confers the benefit 
of the entire allocation to himself. Revenue is maximised by charging PK = P, the free 
market price. Hence, his entire quota allocation is diverted to the free market.
(b) Political Patronage (soft upper bound)
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Suppose that in order to build political support, he shares the benefits of the quota allocation 
between himself and others. To be successful, he charges a K and therefore PK such that
Pk <  P.
That is, he allows his supporters a windfall gain for political returns.15 Individuals will 
therefore visit a politician and incur waiting costs because of the expected benefit of the visit.
The politician’s choice of PK (compared to P) determines the number of consumers who visit 
him. For example, if (a) above is true, all remaining consumers less those gone to the queue 
go to the free market and pay higher cash prices where there is no waiting. Whereas, if (b) 
is applicable, some of the remaining consumers visit the politician because of the expected 
benefit of the visit.16
Suppose that it takes one unit of time cost t to search one politician. Let N consumers join 
the politician’s queue and, since he has one bag offered, only one consumer is lucky. There 
is therefore a risk involved in joining the politician’s queue the likelihood of being 
unsuccessful. We assume a uniform probability of success.
Let t* be the opportunity cost of the last (Nth) person in the politician’s queue. Since those
15The politician’s objective(s) are not modelled here. However, we believe 
that case (b) is the more interesting for the analysis here.
16These are likely to be consumers with a t value between poor and rich 
including those gone to the queue.
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gone to the politician’s queue are individuals between poor and rich, their corresponding 
opportunity costs of time (whose distribution is shown below) will lie between tj + y and t'.
t)
1
t
Where the shaded area is the total cost of waiting in the politician’s queue.
Therefore, the opportunity cost of the last (Nth) person in politician’s queue is 
t' = b + y +N.
Using this diagram, consider an individual with t = tt + y. We ask whether this individual 
prefer the gamble of one unit of time, costs t, for the probability 1/N of gain (=  P - Pr)? 
Similarly, for an individual with t = t', does he prefer the gamble (or is he indifferent) to 
the free market?
If individuals with t' join politician’s queue, those with tj + y go immediately to that queue. 
For individuals with t ', the choice between the politician’s queue or the free market will 
depend on whether
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t' < > (P -Pk)/N [4.8]
But v = (P - Pk)/N defines t' and, since v = t = f , this 
implies that
t' = (P - PjJ/N [4.9]
Equation [4.9] shows that individuals with t = t' are indifferent between the free market and
the politician’s queue if the cost of visit (t') is equal to the expected benefit of the visit [(P - 
Pk)/N].
Using t' = tj + y + N and rewriting Equation [4.9], we have that
tj + y + N = (P - Pk)/N [4.9a]
This defines N (the number of consumers gone to the politician’s queue) as a function of PK
(the politician’s price) given tx + y where = Ps/(1 - /). (See Equation 4.2.)
The equilibrium configuration of the costs and benefits of the visit to politician which
determines N, are illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6 Costs nd Benefits of Visit to Politician
Leones 
per unit 
of visit
E B C
Number of0
consumers
MOC is the opportunity cost curve of visit which is a monotonically increasing function in 
t but is assumed linear here for simplicity, and EBC is the expected benefit curve of visit, 
a rectangular hyperbola defined as EBC = (P - Pk)/N.
Using Figure 4.6, we can analyse the effects of variations in PK on N holding P and t' fixed 
by a simple comparative static exercise. For example, an increase in, PK reduces expected 
benefit from visit and shifts the EBC curve down and to the left. With fixed t', the effect 
is a fall in the number of consumers that visit. Similarly, a decrease in PK increases 
expected benefit from visit and shifts the EBC curve up and to right. With the fixed t \  it 
leads to a rise in the number of consumers that visit. Hence, in this case, richer consumers 
too will go to the politician since the benefit of the visit is now higher.
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The analysis shows that consumers with t < t' visit the politician since the expected gain
exceed the cost of the visit. Therefore, the remaining consumers with value of t > t' go 
immediately to free market since their high t values make it worthwhile to visit the free 
market and pay higher cash prices.
4.4.4a Model Qualification
In the above analysis, we have assumed a uniform probability of success for individuals in 
politician’s queue. This, again, is not very realistic since it was known that individuals 
increased the certainty of getting supplies from the politician by offering higher k values. 
Assuming non-uniform probabilities of success complicates the analysis and do not affect the 
basic results here.
4.4.5 Costs of Queuing in Controlled Sectors
In the official queue, y individuals make one visit costs t. Therefore, the welfare costs of 
queuing in this sector which is part of W\ (Equation 4.4) is
Similarly, in the politician’s queue, N individuals make one visit costs t. The welfare costs 
of queuing in this sector is
q  = rt,+y+Ntdt
Jt , +y [4 . 11]
We can see that Cj and C2 are both functions of the number of rent seekers and the 
opportunity costs of time of individuals in the different sectors. Therefore Q  + C2 gives 
the total welfare costs of labour time used by rent seeking individuals. This is an 
approximation of the total amount of resources lost in unproductive activity and is therefore, 
a measure of the social costs of the activity to the economy.
If information on the variables in C{ and C2 were available, it would be interesting to 
compare the total value of rents to the costs of waiting in each sector. Such comparison 
would indicate the extent to which the rent is dissipated during the period. Unfortunately, 
data on this type of activity is not recorded but, given the large numbers of individuals 
engaged in this activity, it is possible that the welfare costs of queuing may equal or even 
exceed the total value of the rents.
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Chapter 5
METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE COSTS OF RENT 
SEEKING
5.1 Rent-Seeking Costs in the Rice Market
We have argued that price controls were extensive in Sierra Leone during the period under 
consideration. For empirical evidence on rent seeking costs, we focus on rice imports since 
this was the main source of rent seeking in the economy during the period.
The subsidy on imported rice offered potential benefits to those that got access to the 
commodity. The resources devoted to acquiring these rents must be counted as part of the 
deadweight loss due to price controls. Figure 5.1 below illustrates the extent of rent seeking 
costs from rice imports:
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Figure 5.1 Rent-Seeking Costs from Rice Imports
Price
QuantityQ* Q
Assuming that DD represents domestic demand for rice, the government buys rice imports 
at world price Pw and resell each unit at a subsidised price (Ps) below the free market price 
(P). But since imports (Q ) are less than domestic demand (Q) at the subsidised price (Ps), 
this results in domestic excess demand for imported rice. In a situation of scarcity, the right 
to the rent on rice imports is not guaranteed. The demand curve shows that consumers are 
willing to pay a price up to P per unit of import but the actual cost is only Ps. They 
therefore spend resources up to (P - Ps) or (P - Pw) per unit of import to capture the rent or 
if use of such resources guarantees receipt of the government subsidised rice.
We have also indicated that the type of rent seeking activity for rice imports is an investment 
in time, money and any effort to secure any allocation of rice at the subsidised price. Time 
involved is long hours of wait in queues both at a controlled centre or at a politician’s office.
The costs of waiting in queues or offices reduces the rent to recipients and such costs are 
wasted resources devoted to the rent seeking activity17.
5.2 The Size of the Costs of Rent Seeking
Krueger (1974) approximated the annual welfare costs of rent seeking induced by a system 
of price and quantity controls by the annual value of rents. In terms of the analysis here, 
the total rents to be captured from rent seeking in rice imports is given by:
R = r Q* [5.1]
Where r = P - Ps is the rent per unit,
Q* = annual volume of rice imports 
and R = total annual value of rents
Thus, each unit of rice imports confer upon the owner a rent per unit given by the difference 
between the subsidised price and the free market price. As in Mohammad and Whalley 
(1984) and Ampofo-Tuffour et al (1991), we assume that for the politician, rice imports 
attract a premium of 100%. Given the similarities of the institutional structures and 
economies of these countries, the rent-seeking activity is similar and thus introducing similar 
assumptions in the calculations of rents here is not unreasonable. Further, apart from the 
existence of an active free market in foreign exchange during the period which encouraged
17Gallagher (1991) and Varian (1991) refer to these costs as direct or transaction costs of rent 
seeking.
the smuggling of rice across to neighbouring countries, this and the hoarding of the 
commodity resulted in scarcity which pushed up prices still higher. Thus, a 100% premium 
is a reasonable guesstimate of the rent from rice imports.
Obviously, in an ideal world, the best estimate of the welfare costs of rent seeking could be 
calculated using the formulae derived in Section 4.4.5. We can then compare the total rents 
to the real costs incurred in the unproductive activity to determine the extent of rent 
dissipation. Given that hiring of others to wait in line or some identification (eg. buckets, 
stones, etc.) was undertaken in queues, and since only some rent seekers were successful 
with a politician, it is possible that the costs of rent seeking exceeded the value of the rents18.
5.3 Empirical Estimates and Results
There are no recorded data on rent-seeking activities in Sierra Leone. Further, it is difficult 
to obtain correct data on price series and volume of sales for imported commodities, 
including rice. For a snapshot figure of the costs of rent-seeking in rice distribution in Sierra 
Leone, we have used the limited information reported in various studies (eg. Longhurst, R 
et al (1986), and GSL (1987)) and other synthetic data. In the absence of data to compute 
the welfare costs of rent seeking a second best guess - the annual value of rents has been 
estimated.
For an indirect test of rent-seeking, the annual value of rents on rice imports for 1986 are
18In Deacon and Sonstelie (1989), the hiring of others to wait in line for supplies dissipated 
the rents.
calculated using the following procedure:
1. The period is divided into two for the given year to reflect the increase in prices of 
imported goods (including rice) in the second half of that year due to the pursuance of a 
shadow IMF adjustment programme by the Government.
2. Data on the volume of rice sales in the second half of the year are reported in Longhurst, 
R. et al (1987). Using the figure for rice imports for the year, the sales in the first half of 
the year are obtained as the difference between these two figures.
3. Data reported in GSL (1987) (Table 4.1) indicate that during the months of may and 
June 1986, rice agents and politicians received 53% and 40%, respectively, of the total 
supplies. We assume constant shares over the period to estimate the volume of sales in each 
sector for both periods.
4. In the politician’s queue, the rents have been computed by assuming that the politician 
resold his entire quota of through his agents or others who visited him at a premium of 100.0 
percent in excess of his subsidised price for political patronage.
5. Food aid and supplies to institutions (about 7%) is excluded in computing the total rents 
since securing supplies from these sources required a low level of effort. For food aid, the 
donors insisted on the rice being sold at market determined prices with penalties for breach
of this regulation19. In the case of supplies to institutions, government departments, etc., 
these played a socially useful role and did not generate any rent-seeking activity.
6. Finally, since rents are a realised financial gain irrespective of whether the rice is 
consumed or not, total rents are computed for all sales in the official and politician’s queue 
excluding supplies to institutions and food aid sales referred to in note 5 above.
The results (summarised in Table 5.1) show that:
i) total rent-seeking costs in the rice market alone amounted to 5.3 % of GDP in 1986. 
Compared to other results in rent-seeking costs as a percentage of GDP, our estimates are 
similar;
ii) further, in the absence of data on cross-border resale and other similar flows, our 
estimates are biased downwards.
19The United States Government suspended food aid to Sierra Leone when the stipulated 
conditions for sale were violated.
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Table 5.1 Data Base to Calculate Total Rents in the Rice Market. 1986
Variable Period Totals
Jan - Jun Jul - Dec
1. Rice Prices3 (Le/50Kg Bag)
Queue (Ps) 80 170
Politician (P's) 55 110
Politician’s Price (Pk) 110 220
Free Market Price (P) 270 500
2. Rent per Unit (Le)
Queue (P - Ps) 190 330
Politician (Pk - P^) 55 110
Politician’s Queue (P - Pk) 160 280
3. Total Sales'5 (50 Kg Bags) 986,168 813,832 1,800,000
4. Sales in line (50Kg Bags)
Queue (53%) 522,669 431,331 954,000
Politician’s Queue (40%) 394,467 325,533 720,000
5. Rents (’000’ Le) Queue 99,307.1 142,339.2 241,646.3
Politician’s Queue 63,114.7 91,149.2 154,263.9
Total Rents 163,421.8 233,488.5 395,910.3
6. Rents/GDPC(%) 5.3
Notes:
a All prices are average for the period and observed in Freetown except Pk which is 
calculated assuming a premium of 100.0 % on P’s. These prices may be compared 
with average import prices of US$16.4 and 11.3 for the two periods, respectively.
b Total sales equal total imports of 90,000 metric tons in 1986 (1 Mt = 20 * (50kg)
bags).
c Total GDP in 1986 is 7,481.3 million leones.
Sources
1 Author’s calculations
2 Data on rice sales and prices from
a) Longhurst, R. et al (1987),
b) Government of Sierra Leone, 1987.
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Table 5.2 Results in Rent-Seeking Costs as Percentage of GDP
AUTHOR COUNTRY YEAR CATEGORY
RENT 
SEEKING 
COSTS AS % 
OF GDP
Krueger(1974) India 1964 Import Licences 7
Mohammad
and
Whalley (1984) India 1980/81 Import Licenses 3.8
Ampoto- 
Tuffour et al 
(1991) Ghana 1984 Foreign Exchange 6.5
Koroma (1994) Sierra Leone 1986 Rice Imports 5.3
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Chapter 6
REGULATION AND PRODUCER RESPONSE IN THE EXPORT SECTOR
6.1 Objectives of Market Intervention
We have argued that up to the early 1980’s, the government intervened in the export crop 
sector by paying consistently lower prices to export farmers.20 Lower domestic producer 
prices have resulted in lower purchases from farmers by the marketing agency. The reason 
is that farmers have responded by realigning their market activities to reflect incentive 
distortions. In this particular case, they have engaged in illegal sales abroad across the 
country’s immediate borders where they received revenue in convertible currency.21 Such 
illegal sales have resulted in loss of domestic revenue and foreign exchange earnings by the 
government.
The objectives of price intervention by the marketing agency on behalf of the government 
includes inter alia:
(a) to increase the stability of domestic prices;
(b) to maximise foreign exchange earnings, and
(c) to generate revenue to invest in agricultural development and basic infrastructure.
20The marketing arrangements for export crops are discussed in an earlier section.
21The significant discrepancies between agricultural production figures and the marketing agency 
purchases suggest the existence of illegal trade in export crops.
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In the late 1960’s and 1970’s in particular, the government’s agricultural export price policy 
has transferred wealth away from agricultural producers through tax stabilisation. They have 
depressed agricultural domestic prices through a tax wedge and have used the resulting 
revenue to subsidise imports for urban consumers against the interests of farmers. In the 
early 1980’s, with declining purchases and foreign exchange earnings, the government 
increased producer prices substantially and revised the exchange rate to reflect the falling 
value of the currency. This resulted in modest increases in output of export crops and 
consequently on the purchases by the agency.
The next section analyses a short run theoretical model of the production decisions of a 
representative export farmer engaged in both illegal trade as well as official sales to the 
marketing agency. In the case of illegal sales, he risks being caught and punished in terms 
of seizures or fines or both. The farmer reduces the probability of apprehension by incurring 
additional costs in the form of bribes to officials responsible for preventing such illegal trade. 
The model is tested using data for coffee for the period 1964 - 1982.
6.2 Model of Output Choice With Smuggling
The farmer faces a simultaneous decision on the amount of exportable output to produce and 
the disposal of that output between official and illegal channels.
To model the farmer’s choice decision, we make the following simplifying assumptions:
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(i) that the farmer’s decision regarding the amount of illegal sales play a dominant role 
in the output decision;
(ii) that the illegal market is served first and the residual output is sold in the official 
market;
(iii) that the farmer can produce output profitably at the given official producer 
price;
(iv) that in the short run, given the nature of the crop, substitutability is impossible and 
output can be changed only by varying farming intensity given the stock of existing 
trees; and
(v) finally, the farmer faces an uncertain border price for its crop in the neighbouring 
country.
Suppose that X is the total exportable output to be produced and disposed of through the two 
channels. We write X as an identity given by
X = XG + Xp [6.1]
is output sold in the official market at price, P0 , and 
Xp is output sold in illegal channels at parallel price, Pp.
Following Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), assume that illegal trade to neighbouring countries 
takes place through illegal channels. While such smuggling trade increases the farmer’s 
revenues, the costs of smuggling (bribes, fines, etc.) pushes up his marketing costs. As is 
frequently assumed in the literature (Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) and Devarajan et al 
(1989)), the penalty incurred depends on the actual amount of illegal quantities sold (Pitt, 
1981) analyse the case of Indonesian exporters who reduce the risk of being caught by 
increasing legal sales - "legal trade cloaks illegal trade". However, Pitt’s model is
94
inapplicable in the case of export monopsony as in the case analysed here).
If a  is the probability of detection, then a  is a function of the quantity of illegal sales given
The farmer reduces the chance of being caught by incurring additional expenditure in the 
form of bribes, increased transport costs for travelling at night, etc. (exclusive of fines). This 
increases his total short run costs in addition to its variable production costs. Thus, the 
short-run cost function is given by
with C'(X0 +Xp) > 0 and S'(Xp) > 0
where F(X0 + Xp) is the total short run cost function,
C(X0 + Xp) is the variable production costs function, 
and S(XP) is the smuggling cost function.
The farmer is assumed to have a Von Neumann-Morgenstem utility function U defined on 
profit, 7r, and its goal is to maximise its expected utility of profit. More formally, we write 
his maximisation problem as:
by
a  = (x (Xp) where a ’ > 0 [6.2]
F(X0 +  Xp) = C(X0 + Xp) + S(Xp) [6.3]
Max E {U(tr)}
X0, Xp
s.t. X0 > 0 and Xp > 0
[6.4]
95
where U (7r) is the utility of profit function which is concave, continuous and differentiable, 
that is,
U '>  0 and U" < 0 
and E is the expectations operator.22 
The farmer’s profit function is defined as follows:
if he is successful in smuggling, he gets profits, 7Tj and if unsuccessful, he pays a fine B (Xp) 
and gets profits, 7r2. Hence, if he is successful in illegal trade, profits 7r are defined as: 
tt, = P0X0 + Pp Xp - F(X0 + Xp) [6.5]
whereas if he is caught, profits 7t2, are defined as
tt2 = P0X0 - F(X0 + Xp) - B(Xp) [6.5a]
In the latter case he loses the revenue from illegal sales (seizures) and pays the fine B(Xp),
both of which reduces profits. Hence, the expected utility of profit function is given by 
V(X0,Xp) = E {U(tr)} = (l-«) U jfo) + a  U2(tr2) [6.6]
where the first term is the utility of profit if successful in illegal trade and the second term
is the unsuccessful case where caught with probability, a.
In the next section, we derive the conditions for optimal choice of output and sales in the 
illegal market with the assumption of an uncertain or random fluctuations in the price
22Newberry and Stiglitz (1981) provides evidence to show that farmers are risk averse.
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received in a neighbouring country. In this, we are still imposing the small country 
assumption for Pp but is fixed in a stochastic sense.23
6.3 Model of Output Choice With Uncertain Border Price
With an uncertain border price, we retain the price taking assumption in a probabilistic 
sense. That is, we are assuming that the farmer’s beliefs about the price in a neighbouring 
country are summarised in a subjective probability distribution.
Suppose that Pp lies between a lower and upper bound with probability density function f(Pp) 
in the form
Pi < Pp < P2 [6.7]
where
Pj is the lower bound 
and P2 is the upper bound on Pp.
This assumption introduces a further independent source of uncertainty in the model - in 
addition to the uncertainty of being caught doing illegal trade.
23Price volatility in international markets for primary commodities makes this a realistic 
assumption (Sandmo, 1971).
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The farmer’s objective function becomes 
Max V = E{U(tt)}
X„,Xp
= C  {( 1 UJPoXo + PpXp-CCXo + Xp) -  S( Xp) ]
+ aU i[P0X0 -C (X 0 + X0) - S ( X p )  - B ( X p ) ] }  ( 6 . 8
First-order conditions are given by
^ = / ^ ( l - a ) U/ [ P0 - C - ( ^  + Xp)]
+ a l i 't  P0 -  C '( + Xp) ] } / ( Pp) dPp = 0
if X„ >  0 [6.9]
-g jr  = / p^ { ( l  - a j U / t P p  -  C‘(Xo + Xp) -  S *( Xp) ]
- a lt'tC H X o + Xp) + S ' ( Xp) + B ‘( X i , ) ] / ( P p)}dPp = 0
ifXp > 0 [6.10]
where (X0*, Xp*) is the solution to the maximisation problem. Second-order conditions are 
assumed to hold for risk-averse farmers.
Given our assumptions, there are two possible outcomes:
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Case 1
The farmer produces for both the official and illegal markets, i.e.
X0 > 0 and Xp > 0
This outcome follows from Equation 6.9 and a pluasible explanation for this behaviour is that 
smuggling costs and penalities are high with the spread between the official and parallel 
prices narrow. In this case, the farmer will produce for the illegal market until the marginal 
revenue of selling in that market equals the official price (see Figure 6.1 below). At that 
point, he switches over to the official market until at the margin
P0 = C'(X0 + Xp) [6.11]
with marginal revenue curve ABCD. This is the result that the farmer’s choice of output 
depends only on the official price even though he serves both markets.
Case 2
The farmer produces only for the illegal market, i.e.
X0 = 0 and Xp > 0 
Again, this follows from Equation 6.10. In this case, since smuggling costs anenalties are 
low and the spread between P0 and Pp is wide, the farmer has no incentive to sell to the 
official market. He will produce only for the illegal market. Thus, output will depend only 
on the parallel price, i.e.
Pp = MC(X0 + Xp)
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[6.12]
At the point where the marginal revenue from illegal sales equal Marginal cost, Marginal 
revenue is greater than the official price (Figure 6.1a below). This second case is ruled out 
since, during the period, with stiff penalties for selling illegally, farmers were known to have 
served the official market as demonstrated by the official purchases recorded by the 
marketing agency.
If the risk of being caught selling in the illegal market depends only on the quantities sold 
in that market and if penalties are high enough, the farmer’s output depends only on the 
official price he is offered. In general, in the short run, the existence of a parallel market 
increases net revenue (shaded area in figure 6.1) but do not result in additional output.
Figure 6.1 Farmer Produces for both Markets
Price
P,o
OutputX,0 ‘p
100
/
Figigure 6 .la: Farmer Sells to the Illegal Market
X(Pp)X0 X, Output‘p
6.4 Empirical Estimates and Results
The Devarajan et al (1989) result is not general but has the peculiar characteristics that the 
official price is stable whereas the parallel price is uncertain. One thing to test for using 
Sierra Leonean data is whether in the presence of an illegal market, the output of coffee 
producers depends on the official producer price.
For a simple test and to provide empirical support for our theoretical proposition for case 
1, we test for the inclusion of Pp, the parallel price in the output function.
In linear form, the equation to be estimated is:
X = b0 + bi P '0 + b2 P 'p + U [6.13]
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where U is an error term satisfying classical assumptions, P '0 is the real official producer 
price of coffee, and
P 'p is the real parallel price of coffee to smugglers.
Testing for the inclusion of Pp in the equation above is a simple t-test of b2 = 0.
Annual data for the period 1964 - 1990 are used in the estimation. The data and its sources 
are given in Tables 6.1 and 6.1a.
For completeness, we run three regressions:
1) Using both real price variables as independent variables, and
2) Using each real price variable as an independent variable on its own.
The results of the regression are provided below. The procedure used for estimation is 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and the number in parenthesis is the t-statistic for each of the 
coefficients.
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent Variable: Production
Independent Variables: P '0 amd P 'p, real official and parallel producer prices
respectively.
Number of observations: 28
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CON
COEFFICIENTS 
P’ P’x 0 A p
R2 R2 DW SE
Eq.l 4.4717
(3.289)
0.0099 0.0083 
(0.575) (1.526)
0.266 0.207 2.191 3.081
Eq.2 5.2116
(4.002)
0.0296
(2.533)
0.197 0.167 1.975 3.158
Eq.3 4.6921
(3.645)
(0.0107)
(2.995)
0.256 0.256 2.187
3.041
SE = Standard Error of Regression
The low values of R2 for all three equations show that the overall fit is poor. The likely 
important causes of the poor fit are a combination of omitted variables errors in data 
measurement, spurious correlations between output and the real producer price (the internal 
terms of trade) and the parallel price.24
The estimated coefficients for the constant term is significant in all equations and has the 
usual interpretation as the level of output that would be produced regardless of the price.
The estimated coefficients of the price variables have the correct sign but are insignificant 
(at both the 1 % and 5 % significance levels) when estimated together. However, both price 
variables are significant (at both significance levels), when estimated individually and
24Since the objective here is to test for the inclusion of the P variable in the output equation, 
equations have not been estimated with the logs of the variables.
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maintained the correct signs. These results suggest that both price variables may influence 
output independently.
All the regressions show some evidence of negative autocorrelation which may be due to 
spurious correlations. Overall, the empirical results do not provide support to the 
theoretical prediction that, in the short run, total output is determined by the fixed official 
producer price. In the late 1980’s, the increased purchases by SLPMB may be explained by 
increases in producer prices and the increased supplies of rice made available to farmers 
through produce agents at government subsidised prices. Both factors have encouraged 
farmers to prune the trees more often, thereby increasing output with less smuggling of the 
crop.
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Table 6.1 Regression Data: Sierra Leonean Coffee
YEAR PRODUCTION 
(’000 MT)
REAL PRODUCER 
PRICE 
(LE/TON)
REAL PRICE TO 
SMUGGLERS 
(LE/TON)
1963 4 61.29 171.82
1964 6 54.29 208.23
1965 4 80.56 189.83
1966 10 71.05 166.72
1967 3 67.50 149.37
1968 4 72.50 170.54
1969 8 73.81 177.82
1970 6 70.45 231.57
1971 10 70.45 185.54
1972 7 67.39 201.13
1973 12 118.37 254.73
1974 3 103.57 247.79
1975 7 82.09 244.05
1976 5 91.03 451.13
1977 10 187.06 732.91
1978 4 169.15 421.67
1979 14 169.79 382.30
1980 10 136.43 498.51
1981 9 83.02 438.41
1982 9 70.79 297.32
1983 5 111.76 313.76
1984 10 93.46 250.12
1985 10 88.20 252.29
1986 15 292.48 761.38
1987 15 103.89 459.47
1988 10 79.12 527.56
1989 9 64.81 257.95
1990 9 38.41 397.64
DATA SOURCES
1. Production figures are from F. A.O., World Crop and Livestock Statistics, 1948-1985 
and F.A.O., production YearBook, Various.
2. Real prices are from nominal prices in Table 6.1a using the conversion factors
1 Kg = 2.2 lb 
1 MT = 1000 Kg
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Table 6.1 (a): Coffee Prices. Exchange Rates and Consumer Prices. 1963 - 1990
Year Nomininal 
official 
producer 
price Le/kg
World price 
(aUS 
Cents/lb 
N.Y)
Official 
exchange, 
rate (period 
average) 
Le/US$
Parallel
exchange
rateb
Consumer 
prices (period 
average)
1985 = 100
1963 0.19 34.10 0.71 0.71 3.1
1964 0.19 46.66 0.71 0.71 3.5
1965 0.29 43.75 0.71 0.71 3.6
1966 0.27 40.56 0.71 0.71 3.8
1967 0.27 37.72 0.72 0.72 4.0
1968 0.29 37.36 0.83 0.83 4.0
1969 0.31 40.90 0.83 0.83 4.2
1970 0.31 55.80 0.83 0.83 4.4
1971 0.31 44.71 0.83 0.83 4.4
1972 0.31 52.57 0.80 0.80 4.6
1973 0.58 69.19 0.82 0.82 4.9
1974 0.58 73.34 0.86 0.86 5.6
1975 0.55 82.58 0.90 0.90 6.7
1976 0.71 149.48 1.11 1.07c 7.8
1977 1.59 267.14 1.15 1.06 8.5
1978 1.59 165.29 1.05 1.09 9.4
1979 1.89 178.47 1.06 1.11 11.4
1980 1.76 208.79 1.05 1.40 12.9
1981 1.32 186.38 1.16 1.70 15.9
1982 1.43 143.68 1.24 1.90 20.2
1983 3.80 142.75 1.89 3.40 34.0
1984 5.29 149.65 2.51 4.30 56.6
1985 8.82 148.93 5.09 7.70 100.0
1986 52.91 231.19 16.09 27.08 180.9
1987 52.91 106.37 34.04 100.00 509.3
1988 52.91 121.84 32.51 131.61 668.7
1989 70.55 98.76 59.81 180.90 1,088.5
1990 88.19 83.80 151.45 470.60 2,296.2
Notes
a Price of Brazilian coffee.
b Rates are annual average of month-end estimates, based on a sample of transactions.
The rates are average across dealers in Freetown.
c Prior to 1976, the official exchange rate is used as a proxy for the parallel rate due
to data unavailability. However, given a strong external sector during the period and 
since the discrepancy between the official and parallel rates in earlier years for which 
data is available is insignificant, this suggests that the official exchange rate is a 
suitable proxy.
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Sources
1 World price of coffee, official exchange rates and consumer prices are from
International Financial Statistics, Yearbook, 1993, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, D.C.
2 Nominal producer price figures are from:
a) Annual Statistics Digest, Central Statistics Office, Freetown, Various.
b) African Development Indicators, United Nations Development Programme / 
World Bank, 1992, N. Y. and Washington, D. C.
c) African Economic and Financial Data, UNDP / The World Bank, 1989.
3 Parallel exchange rates are from World Currency Yearbook, 1985, International 
Currency Analysis, Inc. Brooklyn, N.Y., and 2b above.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
7.1 Conclusions
The objective of this thesis is to quantify the rents in the economy of Sierra Leone in a 
particular market in 1986. The sources of rent considered are non-market allocation of rice 
and foreign exchange and the monopsonistic behaviour of the agricultural marketing board. 
The results show that the costs of rent-seeking from one controlled commodity are a large 
share of GDP (5.3%). Adding on totals for other controlled commodities and other markets 
(eg. foreign exchange) increases the costs of these activities substantially for this small 
economy. Despite the crude nature of computing these rents, it is obvious that the nature and 
costs of such unproductive activity contributed significantly to the decline of the economy 
during the period.
Rent-seeking retards economic growth in two ways:
(i) Through a diversion of resources from productive to unproductive activities, an 
insignificant proportion of a country’s investment and labour is applied toward 
increasing the output of real goods and services.
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(ii) Through a tax on the means of production, it lowers the incentives to invest or work 
are lowered since rents reduce the net returns to factors.
In this sense, it is important therefore that corrective action is taken to increase the efficiency 
of government spending and reduce its associated rent-seeking waste while improving the 
incentive structure at the same time.
The empirical results do not support the theoretical prediction that the official producer price 
is an important determinant of total agricultural export output. In the short-run therefore, 
it appears that agricultural output can not be increased by simply raising the producer price. 
To elicit the desired supply response may require revisiting other policies other than prices 
alone. Policies that overprice consumer goods and/or the availability or lack of essential 
consumer goods can have a strong effect on the production response of producers of cash 
crops. Also, policies which maintain an overvalued exchange rate can have an important 
influence on output response.
7.2 Policy Implications
Economic efficiency has generally been hindered in the rice and other sectors of the economy 
on both the production and consumption sides. Food subsidies are an essential social safety 
net in small economies such as Sierra Leone which can compensate for the lack of social 
security schemes existing in developed economies. Therefore, food subsidies across-the- 
board should be maintained but by designing subsidy packages that redistribute income 
efficiently without destroying the efficiency of resource allocation. For example, ration
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coupons that are freely convertible eliminate the waste of queuing.
To address the structural problems of the economy requires the implementation of policies 
to liberalise the economy. The policy framework for the economic rehabilitation phase calls 
for economic policies that maintain the incentive framework for eliciting higher production 
and exports. The implementation of structural reforms so far in the economy are 
encouraging. The stabilisation phase has realigned relative prices in favour of production 
and exports, reduced the budget deficit and thereby underlying inflationary pressures, and 
facilitated the flow of imports to ease the severe foreign exchange constraint faced by the 
economy. The availability of basic commodities including petroleum and rice has improved 
considerably. The queues and other activity associated with shortages have since 
disappeared. For a sustainable recovery and growth of the economy, the authorities must 
adhere steadfastly to the liberalisation programme and resist pressures to rescind or modify 
it.
Performance in agriculture is in the short term driven more by weather conditions than 
changes in the incentive structure. Increase in prices is only one of the elements that 
influences the farmers’ production response. The other is regular supply of inputs and 
consumer goods at reasonable prices. It is the internal terms of trade that count. The 
stabilisation of the internal terms of trade with progressive increase in imports as well as the 
alleviation of the shortage of foreign exchange will create the foundation for a sustained 
process of agricultural growth and rural diversification.
Another problem is the rapid decay of the rural transport fleet. Road projects will contribute
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to the improvement of the roads and the easing of the foreign exchange constraint will 
facilitate the rebuilding of the transport fleet.
I l l
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